The United States Department of Homeland Security concept of regionalization-will it survive the test? by Austin, William H.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2006-09
The United States Department of Homeland Security
concept of regionalization-will it survive the test?
Austin, William H.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY CONCEPT OF REGIONALIZATION — WILL 








 Thesis Advisor:  Robert Bach. 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for 
reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and 
reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of 
information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of 
Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
September 2006 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: The United States Department of Homeland Security 
Concept of Regionalization – Will it Survive the Test? 
6. AUTHOR  William H. Austin 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 




9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
                      A 
13. ABSTRACT   
 
The United States Department of Homeland Security has proposed that the nation’s system of response to terrorism 
and catastrophic disasters would be more practical and efficient if handled on a regional basis throughout the country. 
Regionalization is one of three overall priorities under the National Preparedness Goal. The primary hypothesis is there is a 
mismatch between the federal government’s expectations of regionalization and the understanding of it by state and local 
governments. This lack of understanding will negatively impact the expenditure of federal funds in the future. The author 
proposes that there are six major reasons regionalization may fail and that a change of policy by the federal government will be 
necessary to increase the chance of success. The reasons include a lack of definition for regionalization; the impact of 
federalism; the influence of risk-based funding on local interest in regionalization; the impact of home rule and local autonomy; 
risk and liability questions; and the lack of leadership. Three options are considered including maintaining the same program, 
creating a Regional Homeland Security Service Agency, and the Regional Council of Governments (RCG) approach. 
 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
95 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Regionalization, Definition, Federalism, Risk-Based Funding, Home Rule, 
Local Autonomy, Risk, Liability, Leadership, Third-Party Government 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
CONCEPT OF REGIONALIZATION — WILL IT SURVIVE THE TEST? 
 
William H. Austin, CFO 
Fire Chief, West Hartford Fire Department 
B. S., Virginia Commonwealth University, 1974 
M.P.A., Troy State University, 1993 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 








Author:    William H. Austin 
 
 
Approved by: Robert Bach, Ph. D. 
 Thesis Advisor 
 
 
 Christopher Bellavita, Ph. D.  
 Second Reader 
 
 
 Douglas Porch 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
The United States Department of Homeland Security has proposed that the 
nation’s system of response to terrorism and catastrophic disasters would be more 
practical and efficient if handled on a regional basis throughout the country. 
Regionalization is one of three overall priorities under the National Preparedness Goal. 
The primary hypothesis is that there is a mismatch between the federal government’s 
expectations of regionalization and the understanding of it by state and local 
governments. This lack of understanding will negatively impact the expenditure of 
federal funds in the future. The author proposes that there are six major reasons 
regionalization may fail and that a change of policy by the federal government will be 
necessary to increase the chance of success. The reasons include a lack of definition for 
regionalization; the impact of federalism; the influence of risk-based funding on local 
interest in regionalization; the impact of home rule and local autonomy; risk and liability 
questions; and the lack of leadership. Three options are considered, including maintaining 
the same program, creating a Regional Homeland Security Service Agency, and the 
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I. REGIONALIZATION — WILL IT SURVIVE THE TEST? 
The United States Department of Homeland Security has proposed that the 
nation’s system of response to terrorism and catastrophic disasters would be more 
practical and efficient if handled on a regional basis throughout the country. 
Regionalization is one of the three overall priorities under the National Preparedness 
Goal. The concept backed by official documents, funding decisions and strategy 
formulation makes regionalization a high stakes public policy. The primary hypothesis is 
there is a mismatch between the federal government’s expectations of regionalization and 
the understanding of it by state and local governments. This lack of understanding will 
negatively impact the expenditure of federal funds in the future. The writer proposes that 
there are six major reasons regionalization may fail and that a change of policy by the 
federal government will be necessary to increase the chance of success at the local 
government level.  
Thus far, the Department of Homeland Security has not put forth a clear definition 
of regionalization. Regionalization can be a somewhat meaningless term, often confused 
with and politically reduced to the same thing as consolidation. At the federal level, 
regionalization is usually considered to include whole states. Also, it is normally used in 
the context of how federal agencies structure themselves to deliver a service. As a result, 
this is a case where the federal government is attempting to tell local municipalities how 
to deliver their services. At the state level, regionalization may not be encouraged 
because the basic sub-state level of government is the county and many states have 
statutes that block regional efforts. Locally, regionalization escapes clarity because of 
conflicting views on any type of consolidation by labor, management and the public in 
general. 
A.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The definition of regionalization differs greatly depending on the locality or state. 
Finding a definition for “regionalization” at the federal level is sketchy and non-
conclusive. At the core of the problem is the constitutional principal of Federalism, which 
by design, always impacts how state and federal decisions go together. How does 
Federalism fit with the Department of Homeland Security’s emphasis on regionalization? 
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How will it affect the success of regionalization? Years of grant fund policy is being 
changed to accommodate the new risk-based funding distribution proposed by the 9/11 
Commission and Congress. Will the change to risk-based funding influence local 
decisions to participate in regionalization efforts? Also, how do we account for the 
influence of risk to the local governments? Has anyone fully defined or vetted liability 
and workers compensation problems through the political process?  
One of the primary challenges in regionalization involves the cultural aspect of 
local autonomy and home rule. It needs to be analyzed and factored into plans for 
success. Are we to assume that all localities and states will accept the risks and liabilities 
associated with regionalization without significant legal debate? Where will the 
leadership at a regional level emerge if political figures owe their election and authority 
to established jurisdictions and set boundaries? It is not apparent at the federal level 
whether this vital element has been investigated.  
B.  SPECIFIC RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine previous state and local comparative 
lessons and the federal proposition as currently proposed, identify differences in their 
visions and plans, and compare arguments for and against regionalization proposals. The 
research is designed to offer alternative proposals for change and make a practical policy 
recommendation for success. 
C.  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
Across the nation, local and state officials await guidance from the Department of 
Homeland Security on how to institute or make the regionalization concept work for their 
jurisdictions. This thesis will review and enhance the awareness of the problem, explain 
common factors that signal failure and conversely can be countered for success, lend 
maturity to the national debate, and offer an analysis of several alternatives and a 
proposed solution. The research will suggest guidance on a practical policy issue that 
affects every community in the United States. 
D.  REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The concept of regionalization as proposed by the Department of Homeland 
Security is relatively new and the depth of documentation and data analysis is limited. 
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While schools of thought are developing around broad public policy, sub-issues such as 
regionalization must rely on associated data developed under different contexts. 
The literature review in this thesis is built around three broad areas, beginning 
with federal documents that set the stage for controversy over the lack of a clear 
definition, the impact of federalism and risk-based funding distribution on the concept of 
regionalization. Next, a series of state documents will be used to explain in general an 
individual state’s focus including restrictions on the application of regionalization and the 
impact of home rule. Finally, a third group of leadership, current governmental affairs, 
and commentary type documents will be used to round out the analysis concerning local 
autonomy and the lack of leadership at the regional level. 
Beginning with the question of definition, the federal government is sending 
mixed messages. The National Strategy for Homeland Security is silent on the definition 
of a region.1 However, it is a strong statement endorsing the need for collaboration and 
mutual support at all levels of government. The Interim National Preparedness Goal 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness, issued in March 
2005, states that “as used in this document, “region” generally refers to a geographic area 
consisting of contiguous state, local, and tribal entities located in whole or in part within 
a designated planning radius of a core high threat urban area.”2  
In July, 2005, further guidance was issued in the urban area strategy which states 
“the goal does not mandate that state and local governments adopt a regional 
governmental structure, but it does require that all levels of government embrace a 
regional approach to building capacities.”3 Additionally, expanded regional collaboration 
is an overarching priority that contributes to the development of all 36 identified 
capabilities in the Target Capabilities Listing, still without reference to what regional 
means.4  
                                                 
1 Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, July 2002). 
2 U. S. President, “Interim National Preparedness Goal,” Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive/HSPD-8: National Preparedness (Washington, D.C.: GPO, March 2005), 11. 
3 Department of Homeland Security, State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy – Guidance 
on Aligning Strategies with the National Preparedness Goal (Washington, D.C.: GPO, July 2005), 9. 
4 Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List, Version 2.0 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
August 22, 2005). 
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Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness gives further 
guidance by stating that “the effects of major events and the associated required 
capabilities necessary to prevent and respond to such events should drive the size and 
jurisdictional makeup of the sub-state region.”5  
The draft National Infrastructure Protection Plan makes the statement “virtually 
all regional efforts are initiated locally without top-down mandate.”6 This statement 
seems to recognize the motivation for success, while at the same time continuing to pass 
on giving a clear definition of regionalization to local governments.7 
The 109th Congress is also dealing with the question of regionalization. Here 
again, the issue is not about definition, but rather a question of how the absence of a 
unified set of regional offices within the Department of Homeland Security could 
complicate efforts to implement the National Response Plan should a massive catastrophe 
occur.8 The issue specifically deals with “to what extent have DHS officials considered 
how state, local, and tribal organizations will implement the National Response Plan 
while the regional office framework is being developed?”9  
The one exception to the lack of definition appears to be the Department of 
Homeland Security insistence on defining the designated Urban Area Security Initiative 
(UASI) regions, with all other determination of sub-state regionalization left to the 
discretion of the States. 
The distribution of federal funds by a risk-based process potentially stands to be a 
major influence on the success of the regionalization initiative. Starting with Fiscal Year 
2006, the federal government has already begun to distribute funds based on a pre-
                                                 
5 HSPD 8, 21.  
6 Department of Homeland Security, Draft National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington, 
D.C.: GPO, 2005), 53. 
7 DHS, National Strategy, xiii. Local government is defined as “any county, city, village, town, 
district, or other political subdivision of any state, any Native American tribe or authorized tribal 
organization, or Alaska native village or organization, and includes any rural community or unincorporated 
town or village or any other public entity for which an application for assistance is made by a state or 
political subdivision thereof.” 
 8 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2004).  
9 Congressional Research Service, The National Preparedness System: Issues in the 109th Congress 
(Washington, D.C., Library of Congress, January 19, 2006), 26. 
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determined set of risk evaluation factors. Initial guidance mandates the state 
administrative agent formulate the grant requests and investment justification and even 
though collaboration is not required, in many cases there was extensive collaboration of 
state and local governments. The competitive nature of large metropolitan areas will 
garner the bulk of funding. The realization by small communities that their terrorist threat 
is considered low by the insignificant funding provided may also undermine the value of 
regional efforts. 
Assuming the federal government can define regionalization and determine how 
to distribute funds based on risk, what influence does the state government have on the 
concept of regionalization? Regionalization has been tried with various degrees of 
success in most states. However, reality and practical application play a huge role. Even 
the federal government admits that “Historically, the American governance system, 
divided into federal, state and local jurisdictions, does not provide a natural vehicle for 
discussing public policy issues from a regional, multi-jurisdictional perspective. The 
autonomy of local jurisdictions and competing priorities within and among them makes 
regional coordination difficult.”10  
States consistently use a top-down policy approach and this fact coupled with the 
trappings of federalism is evident in the federal approach to homeland security 
regionalization. With the ability to designate the regions within their respective state, 
regions were formed that immediately received political pushback. States like Florida and 
others for example, discovered that locals object to the one-size-fits-all approach.11  
Most states are caught in cross-purposes. In order to receive federal homeland 
security funding (by any method of distribution), states are required to establish regions 
at their own discretion. In many cases this brings up the old argument about home rule, 
such as in Massachusetts where there is little sense that boundaries of a region define a 
community of shared interest.12 Community of shared interest is used here in a broad 
                                                 
10 House Committee on Government Reform, Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination 
Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness.  Document # GAO-04-1009 (Washington, D.C.:  Homeland 
Security, September 2004), 28. 
11 Urban Land Institute, Building Florida’s Future – State Strategies for Regional Cooperation 
(Washington, D.C.: ULI-the Urban Land Institute, 2005), 7. 
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social science sense to mean a commonality of experience in the daily lives of citizens. 
For example, the Tampa-St. Petersburg, Florida, area shares a community of interest in 
governmental planning, colleges, business and economic development, transportation 
systems, and media coverage. Including Tampa in an area with Lakeland or Orlando,  
Florida, would be counter productive. In many cases, regional cooperation is 
automatically equated with giving up control and power.  
A significant number of states, including some without county governments, rely 
on legislatively established regional planning offices or council of governments.13 While 
seemingly a logical step towards establishing regional collaboration, a major blocking 
factor exists in the form of missing formal decision-making structures. The level of 
coordination between local government and first responder groups remains a barrier to 
regional planning efforts, according to a recent National Association of Development 
Organizations survey.14 Also, “Except in rare instances, regions have no policy, no 
governing body, no chief executive, and no by-laws.”15   
Even though home rule is often considered more myth than fact, it is still a factor 
to be reckoned with. Home rule or “Dillon’s Rule” is a little known judicial doctrine 
named for a 19th century Iowa Supreme Court Justice that state laws allow localities to 
possess only such powers as are specifically delegated to them by state law. New Jersey 
has traditionally boasted its home rule orientation and citizens generally believe that 
forced regionalization can be construed as taking away local accountability.16 
The third group of documents to be studied will analyze local autonomy, risk and 
liability issues and the question of leadership at the local level. Challenges to 
regionalization will be most vocal at the local level, as “Americans like the idea of small, 
                                                 
12 David Barron and Gerald Frug, Dispelling the Myth of Home Rule – Local Power in Greater Boston 
(Cambridge, MA: Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston, 2004), 72. 
13 National Association of Development Organizations, State Associations of Regional Councils of 
Government and Regional Development Organizations. 
14 National Association of Development Organizations, Regional Approaches to Homeland Security 
Planning and Preparedness – Survey of the Nation’s Regional Development Organization (Washington, 
D.C.: NADO, August, 2005), 7. 
15 Katherine Foster, Smart Governance, Smart Growth (Buffalo, N.Y.: Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy, LILP-Product Code: CP00A02. 2000), 3. 
16 New Jersey Task Force on School District Regionalization. Findings and Recommendations 
(Trenton, N.J.: State Printing Office, 1999). 
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accessible, responsive local governments and have not been quick to embrace larger 
governing bodies.”17 
Turning back to the confusion over the term regionalization and how it is easy to 
misinterpret as consolidation by another name, the federal government may not have 
considered the leadership required to sell the concept in certain states. Union resistance is 
a given and any leader considering regionalization should analyze the impact of 
collective bargaining. In many states, unions are a powerful force and any action that may 
alter working conditions must be handled in a methodical manner. Also, collaboration 
results need to be assessed because any loss in efficiency due to political, institutional 
and technical pressures diminishes public value.18 
E.  HYPOTHESIS 
As stated on page one, the primary hypothesis is there is a mismatch between the 
federal government’s expectations of regionalization and the understanding of it by state 
and local governments. This lack of understanding will negatively impact the expenditure 
of federal funds in the future. Three alternative proposals will be offered for 
implementing the regionalization concept, as well as the expected outcome for each 
based on external and internal influences. A proposed solution will be recommended. 
Regionalization of homeland security efforts in the United States can succeed if based on 
clear definitions, solid leadership and a system that allows input into the decision making 
process from the regional level. 
F.  METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The methodology in this research will include a comparative analysis of the 
regionalization issue through a review of various efforts of state, county and local 
governments to accomplish some degree of regionalization. These comparisons will 
produce the mitigating factors that influence the degree of success, or lack thereof, of 
regionalization efforts. Additionally, research of successful and failed regionalization 
case studies will be used as supporting evidence of the main claim. Benchmarks for 
                                                 
17 National Cooperative Highway Research Program, Building Effective Relationships between 
Central Cities and Regional, State, and Federal Agencies – A Synthesis of Highway Practice (Washington, 
D. C.: National Academy Press, 2001), 8. 
18 Robert Agranoff, “A New Look at the Value-Adding Functions of Intergovernmental Networks,” 
Paper prepared for the Seventh National Public Management Research Conference at Georgetown 
University  (Bloomfield, IN.: Indiana University, October 9, 2003), 2. 
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measuring success or failure are not fully determined by the general literature on the 
subject. However, continuation or cessation of various government initiatives should 
yield realistic indicators. Research will include comments from officials who support and 
oppose regionalization, applicable statistical data and comparative analysis methodology 
to develop a proposed solution or policy adjustment.  
The multiple initiatives used in the comparative analysis will include successful 
cases that illustrate the political reality, human nature and common goals needed for a 
positive experience, as well as failures that represent negative experiences.  
G.  THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis is organized into eight chapters. Chapter I explains the problem, 
provides background on its significance to the Department of Homeland Security, and the 
structure of the thesis. Chapter II begins the discussion on federalism and why it could be 
a significant issue in the potential failure of the regionalization concept. This chapter also 
deals with the changing responder roles and the emerging network approach to homeland 
security.  
Chapter III points out the Department of Homeland Security’s oversight in 
defining the term regionalization, the difficulty it is having, and the problems it is causing 
state and local governments. This chapter gives the federal perspective, discusses third 
party government, and introduces the regional networking perspective. Chapter IV 
explores a third potential failure point concerning regionalization, local autonomy and 
home rule. In this chapter home rule is discussed and the chapter touches on the impact of 
internal forces such as organized labor and leader weakness, including the vagaries of 
egos. Chapter V explains how the failure to accept the increasing risk related issues 
involved in regionalization can influence success.  
Chapter VI begins the analysis of risk-based funding distribution and the 
decisional elements that it drives. Elements such as power, distribution problems, the 
filter of state administrative agents and risk-based perception versus reality are analyzed. 
Chapter VII explains the sixth reason that regionalization could fail. The chapter deals 
with the leadership requirements at the regional level to accomplish the objectives of the 
DHS mandates. The required nature and model of leadership are discussed and the 
9 
regional leadership weaknesses are explained. DHS is sending mixed signals in the area 
of leadership and the politics of the issue are captured in the research. 
Chapter VIII deals with three alternatives the author feels should be reviewed in 
addressing the potential problem. It also provides a recommendation and provides a 
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II. IT BEGINS WITH FEDERALISM 
Perhaps no other issue has the potential to impact the success of “regionalization” 
more than federalism. Federalism, the basis of the American system of government, is 
often overlooked for the powerful political force it is. It is not clear how much, if any, 
study or research on federalism the Department of Homeland Security used to influence 
its regionalization decision. How obvious is this? Think of the complicated and 
questionable emergency response to Hurricane Katrina. 
The federal government seemed stymied on a number of fronts. The televised 
coverage of intergovernmental debate clearly exhibited the concept of federalism. The 
nation watched as President George W. Bush tried to convince Governor Kathleen 
Blanco to allow the federalization of Louisiana National Guard troops. While entertaining 
to a degree and scary to many viewers, it’s easy to forget “the founding fathers created a 
constitutional framework in which each state, upon ratification of the Constitution, ceded 
some of its powers to the federal government to create a limited central government.”19 
But, the states did not relinquish control of their militias. Additionally, it was tempting to 
argue that the federal government should just do something. Here again, the Constitution 
also respects state powers by reserving those powers not given to the federal government 
to the States or to the people.20 Following these principles, the founding fathers created 
the federal government to do those things that States cannot or should not do 
individually, such as defending the nation, conducting foreign relations, and ensuring 
open and free interstate commerce.21 
Additionally, both the Insurrection Act and the Robert T. Stafford Act require the 
state to make the initial request for help before the President would authorize assistance 
to restore order or help with a major disaster. The Stafford Act has a straight forward 
                                                 
19  James Madison, “The Alleged Danger from the Powers of the Union to the State Governments 
Considered,” The Federalist 45 (Philadelphia, PA.: Publius, January 26, 1788), 308-14: “The powers 
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal government, are few and defined. Those which are to 
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”  
20 United States Constitution, Amendment 10. 
21 United States Constitution, Article 1, section 8; Article 2, section 2. 
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requirement that is clearly understood by most governors.22 The Insurrection Act has two 
additional sections that allow the President to take independent action where it becomes 
necessary to enforce federal laws, Constitutional rights and judicial decisions.23 
A.  NEW FEDERAL INITIATIVES 
Two recent federal initiatives also exert significant influence. Developed under 
the guidance of the Department of Homeland Security, the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP) enforce the 
concepts of incident management at the lowest level and the federal government playing 
a support role. “The National Incident Management System establishes standardized 
incident management protocols and procedures that all responders – federal, state, and 
local – should use to conduct and coordinate response actions. It sets forth a core set of 
doctrine, concepts, principles, terminology and organizational processes to enable 
effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management at all levels of government.”24  
The National Response Plan is based on the traditions and customs that have 
developed under American federalism and is built on the premise that incidents are 
generally handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible.25 It is significant that the new 
plan is called “National” instead of “Federal” because it symbolizes the combined efforts 
of local, state and federal resources. In reality, it is often overlooked that the National 
Response Plan only deals with the mobilization and utilization of federal resources.  
State responsibilities are increasing due to federalism and the federal maneuver to 
use the Target Capabilities List to set standards and increase responsibilities for a higher 
level of response by emergency agencies. Some researchers believe governance can only 
be effectively achieved in the future by regions sharing power.26 This is based on the 
belief that massive resources remain unused at the local government level and the best 
                                                 
22 U. S. Congress, The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 
93-288, section 5170 and section 5191 (amended June 2006). 
23 10 United States Code, section 332 and 333 (2005). 
24 Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, March 1, 2004), ix. 
25 DHS, National Response Plan, 15. 
26 Jan Grell and Gary Gappert, “The Future of Governance in the United States: 1992-2002,” The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences (New York, N.Y.: Sage Publications, 
July 1992), 77. 
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way to harness them is to create intrastate regions and empower them to act outside their 
home jurisdictions. Further reinforcement of the federalism concept is supplied by the 
1990’s creation of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), which 
allows States to assist each other before asking for assistance under the Stafford Act.27 
Any system that strengthens the state’s ability to operate in-state or between states 
without having to involve the federal government will ultimately increase the concept of 
federalism. Incidentally, an EMAC request is not a requirement before federal help can 
be obtained, but it is encouraged. 
B.  FEDERALISM AS AN ISSUE 
The issue of federalism over shadows the question of defining regionalization 
because the Department of Homeland Security knows it would receive immediate 
political pushback from the states and would fail if it just announced what the regions 
would be within each state. With the exception of the designated Urban Area Security 
Initiative (UASI) regions, which are determined by the Department of Homeland 
Security, all other determination of sub-state regionalization is left to the discretion of the 
States. States such as California, New York and Missouri would argue however, that the 
naming of major metropolitan areas as UASI regions is an attempt by the federal 
government to interfere in the determination of appropriate regions within each state. 
And ironically, changing and re-designating UASI regions has proven a very contentious 
political point in the affected states. Examples of this occurred in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
which lost its designation as a UASI region and Oakland, California, which was once a 
stand alone UASI region and is now combined with other major cities in the San 
Francisco Bay area. In both cases, the DHS decision withstood local, state and 
congressional political pressure to change back to more favorable local conditions.  
Federalism is a major obstacle to the concept of regionalization. The 
combinations of forces that create the obstacles are interchangeable and often deep-seated 
and include the following factors.   
States consistently use a top-down policy approach and this fact coupled with the 
trappings of federalism is evident in the federal approach to homeland security 
                                                 
27 U. S. Congress, Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Public Law 104-321, (October 19, 
1996). 
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regionalization. With the ability to designate the regions within their respective state, 
regions were formed that immediately received political pushback. States like Florida for 
example, discovered that locals object to the one-size-fits-all approach.28 Florida 
weathered many problems with the concept of regionalization, but still experiences 
difficulty for example with watershed issues on Lake Okeechobie and the Everglades. 
Several other states experienced heated debate about how regions were to be formed and 
what community of interest (described in Chapter 1) would be used as the basis the 
decision. Connecticut, for example, went through a series of stakeholder meetings over a 
period of six months just to decide what the regions in the state would look like. The 
original recommendations of the committee were politically altered several times until 
the State Emergency Management and Homeland Security Coordinating Council 
declared a moratorium on further changes for one year.29 Still missing in the equation is 
the Connecticut State-wide Fire Mutual Aid Plan, which has only three regions and the 
Regional Planning Organizations and Councils of Government, which number fifteen.  
C.  MIXED SIGNALS 
The National Response Plan includes a Catastrophic Incident Annex which 
“establishes the context and overarching strategy for implementing and coordinating an 
accelerated, proactive national response to a catastrophic incident.30 The plan allows for 
the federal government to change from the “pull” system (help called for under the 
Stafford Act by the Governor) currently in place by statute, to a “push” system (DHS 
decides what a state needs and sends it regardless of a request by the state) as a way to 
circumvent the inconvenience of federalism. 
Continuing to confuse the debate is the fact that under the National Response Plan 
the Principal Federal Officer (PFO) does not direct or replace the incident command 
structure established at the incident, nor does the PFO have directive authority over the 
federal coordinating officer, or other federal and state officials.31 
                                                 
28 Urban Land Institute, Building Florida’s Future, 7. 
29 Hartford, CT, Coordinating Council Meeting Minutes for February 9, 2006 (Department of 
Emergency Management and Homeland Security, 2006). 
30 DHS, National Response Plan, Catastrophic Incident Annex, CAT-1. 
31 Ibid., 33. 
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Additionally, a key overarching national priority is expanding regional 
collaboration.32 The concept, which advocates a regional approach, allows regions to 
coordinate planning and protection, spread costs and share risk. It also ignores the 
concept of federalism. In fact, you don’t find any federal language that starts to recognize 
federalism until you read the UASI instructional manual, which says, “The goal does not 
mandate that state and local governments adopt a regional governmental structure, but it 
does require that all levels of government embrace a regional approach to building 
capabilities.33 While silent on the issue of federalism, the strength behind the requirement 
is obviously its ability to lead through federal funding requirements and by supplying 
specialized federal resources during disasters.  
Another federal document that impacts on the concept of federalism is Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive-5. Under this directive it is possible for the federal 
government to respond in a “proactive” manner and handle an incident without approval 
of the state government. In accordance with HSPD-5, there are four conditions that can 
trigger the National Response Plan. These conditions are: 
• A federal department acting under its own authority asks for help; 
• State and local authorities are overwhelmed and ask for help; 
• More than one federal department is substantially involved in the incident; 
or 
• The Secretary has been directed to assume responsibility for managing the 
domestic incident by the President.34 
One could argue all four of these conditions were met during Hurricane Katrina 
and it didn’t help the situation or speed up the decision making process. Hurricane 
Katrina seems to offer dramatic proof that the federal government is not and should not 
be the Nation’s first responder. The President actually declared Katrina an “incident of 
national significance” on August 27, 2005, days before it touched the Gulf Coast, and the 
outcome was chaos. President Bush and Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco debated 
the federalization of state National Guard troops for two days and in the end the 
                                                 
32 HSPD-8, “National Preparedness,” 11. 
33 Department of Homeland Security, State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy – Guidance 
on Aligning Strategies with the National Preparedness Goal (Washington, D.C.: GPO, July 22, 2005). 
34 U. S. President, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
February 2003), Section 4. 
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resolution was the swearing in of a three-star general into the National Guard to give him 
power in the state. The National Guard forces were never federalized and an active duty 
general joined the guard. It reinforces the fact that federalism always comes into play in 
major disasters. 
D.  CHANGING RESPONDER ROLES  
Have responder roles changed due to federalism or become any clearer since 
Katrina? It seems like every organization in existence has studied the response to the 
storm and issued their perspective on success or failure. Within days senior officials at all 
levels of government retired, were reassigned or were terminated. The President began to 
publicly advocate for a stronger more prominent role for the United States Military. The 
military in turn developed anxiety over the potential changing role and its impact on their 
main battle mission. Once again in the halls of Congress, governmental offices, and in the 
streets, the debate over the proper role of the federal government began anew. Homeland 
Security Secretary Michael Chertoff seemed to differ with the President also. “Chertoff 
emphasized that the federal government would not supplant state and local emergency 
responders on the front line of a disaster and that their proper role was in support.”35 
Regardless of the flow and direction of the debate, nothing significant will change until 
the underlying issue of federalism has been addressed. Totally missed by investigators 
was the success or failure of Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) 
activities. For such an important concept, investigators should ask how their response 
compared to any other organization. EMAC, by the way, is not even mentioned in the 
National Response Plan. Is this because it adds a fourth tier to the emergency 
management response system in the United States and delays the need for federal 
response? Is it because it is not considered as a part of the disaster response system at the 
federal level? Or could it be because it conflicts with the DHS goal of establishing multi-




                                                 
35 Chris Strohm, “Chertoff vows feds won’t supersede local responders,” Congress Daily (March 20, 
2006). http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=33640&printerfriendlyVers=1& (Accessed on 
March 21, 2006). 
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E. WHY REGIONALIZE? 
Even with uncertainty about the impact of federalism and the missing definition 
of regionalization, the federal government seems fascinated with the concept. At the 
federal level, regionalization is usually considered to include whole states. Also, it is 
normally used in the context of how federal agencies structure themselves to deliver a 
service. Instead, the homeland security application is a case where the federal 
government is attempting to tell local municipalities how to deliver their service. Why the 
effort to get around federalism? Is it because regions have worked so well in the past?  
For example, policy leaders at the federal, state and local levels have closely 
monitored programs such as the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) and 
consistently cite the 13-state commission as the premier example for a successful regional 
approach.36 This model is touted because it facilitates a “bottom-up” approach where 
local development districts and others bring ideas to the commission from the local 
level.37 This illustration along with the experience with FEMA regions appears to be part 
of the thought process concerning homeland security regionalization. In addition, the 
model is thought to help in implementing collaboration within a sub-state region. But, 
once again, the argument leads to the realization that there is an absence of local input in 
the decision. Being allowed to present your ideas to a commission is not the same thing 
as being involved in the decision making process. 
The homeland security mission requires a national effort – federal, state, and local 
governments partnering together and with the private sector. It is critical that we identify 
tasks that are most efficiently accomplished at the federal versus local or regional level.38 
Regionalization is suppose to be all about emergency service delivery. The mission starts 
with local response capability and must include private sector elements and non-
governmental organizations.  
                                                 
36 National Association of Development Organizations Research Foundation, Federal State Regional 
Commissions: Regional Approaches for Local Economic Development (Washington, D.C.: NADO, April 
2003), 3. 
37 Local Development Districts are know as regional development organizations and locally as 
economic development districts, councils of governments, regional planning councils, planning and 
development districts and area development districts. 
38 DHS, National Strategy, 64. 
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While Federalism is a means of taking regional differences (cultural or other) into 
account by granting extensive political autonomy, regionalization is very different in 
institutional terms. First, it is always asymmetrical, whereas states have equal status by 
the Constitution, regions by any definition will lack peer status and be much more 
culturally distinct. Second, the federal government participates with the states to exercise 
certain responsibilities at the state level. There is no provision at the federal level to 
directly involve itself in state defined regions. Regions within a state are not necessary 
state authorities, usually have no state power and generally do not exercise any state 
responsibilities at the federal level.39 It would be wise for the federal government to study 
the cultural differences implicit in the proposed regions and analyze the potential impact 
of any federal direction or regulations. Cultural difference in the nation’s regions is not a 
concept that is easily understood or accepted by Homeland Security.  
Additionally, local control is a politically sacred idea. For example, 
regionalization causes a lot of fear of losing decision-making power and influence. Local, 
tribal and state authorities still maintain certain parochial attitudes and embrace the 
concept of sharing resources when it benefits their individual interests. These 
independent attitudes will continue to block cooperative efforts to achieve common 
goals.40 
F.  A POSSIBLE NEW APPROACH 
Federalism has long been the guiding principle for allocating responsibilities to 
meet the needs of citizens after disasters. Remaining committed to a federalist approach 
is not just being a slave to tradition. It is a precedent based on practicality and experience. 
Both scientific research on disaster response and an analysis of recent emergencies argue 
that it is still the right approach.41 
But, many experts believe a dramatic change to federalism is needed. Henry 
Cisneros, former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development during the Clinton 
                                                 
39 Claudia Pamfil, Evolving intergovernmental relations for effective Development in the Context of 
Regionalization (New York, NY: Open Society Institute, November 2003), 23. 
40 Susan K. Reinertson, Resource Sharing: Building Collaboration for Regionalization, Naval 
Postgraduate School  (Monterey, California, September 2005), 9. 
41 James J. Carafano, “Learning from Disaster: The Role of Federalism and the Importance of 
Grassroots Response,” The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder #1923 (Washington, D.C.: Heritage 
Foundation Press, March 21, 2006), 1. 
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administration, says “the intergovernmental partnership that has defined American 
governance for most of the nation’s history is unraveling. Our nation is unsettled. It has 
come through a series of transformations but hasn’t settled on a model for 
intergovernmental relations.”42 
Intergovernmental relations structures should be viewed as overlapping networks 
serving diverse functions. Conceptualizing intergovernmental relations by using network 
theory means that the system should be based on linkages and interrelationships, rather 
than hierarchical layers. Network thinking, rather than the standard notions of federalism, 
will promote the Department of Homeland Security’s flexibility and adaptability.43 
                                                 
42 National League of Cities, “Is the Federal-State-Local Partnership Being Dismantled? Roundtable 
Proceedings,” Research Report on America’s Cities, National League of Cities (Washington, D.C.: NLC 
Press, 2003), iii. 
43 National Academy of Public Administration, Advancing the Management of Homeland Security: 
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III. REGIONALIZATION — WHAT’S IN A NAME 
One of the first problems with the federal mandate called regionalization is what 
the word really means. How do you define regionalization? Are we going by the federal 
definition, whatever that is, or is there another definition that will makes more sense to 
state and local governments? Whatever it is, does anyone at any level really understand 
it? And even if we don’t know the definition, there is a pretty strong argument in favor of 
regionalization when you study past events in the United States. The term itself implies 
that a defined number of governments are coming together for the greater good of the 
public. Are these governments at the state level? Are they counties? Regionalization at 
some level provides the opportunity to use mutual aid resources and deploy response 
assets that a single municipality acting alone may not even know exist. Arguably it 
provides a more effective and efficient use of resources, but it defies the human nature of 
the local government culture.  
These questions and many others require some official guidance. The first 
responders and planners of the world require a little clarification in order to proceed. This 
is no small task. You only have to look at the federal confusion to begin to see the 
problem. 
A.  FEDERAL PERSPECTIVE 
The Department of Homeland Security loosely applies the concept of 
regionalization to any multi-state activity, such as the National Capitol Region or the 
current Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Regions. Yet, they also use 
regionalization to explain the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant program, 
which normally involves multiple municipalities within a given state. Not to be out done, 
the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services provided funding to states to form 
Bioterrorism regions. These regions do not usually correspond to any other agency 
boundaries.  
There are many conflicting signals on the definition of regionalization. The 
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS), the Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) 
and even the UASI guidance say regional but focus on local municipalities. It wasn’t 
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until the FY06 funding guidance that UASI forced the true regionalization concept by 
focusing on risk-based funding. This guidance forced cities like New York to realize that 
the limited funding was intended for a larger area than just the city.  
The various states are left to their own definition of regional boundaries as 
demonstrated across the nation. In many cases, the local governments themselves have 
absolutely no use for the term regionalization because of the negative connotation and 
similarity with the contentious issue of consolidation.  
The emphasis on regionalization as a priority without clear definition creates a 
certain degree of confusion in the funding recommendations and in many cases is counter 
productive to the Department of Homeland Security overarching goal of expanded 
regionalization. For example, according to one study, without clearer definitions the 
influx of new money reinforces existing divisions between state, federal and local health 
agencies in the United States, actually making the nation less prepared.44 Even the feds 
have a problem with regionalization. “The boundaries of their regional offices rarely 
coincide and former House of Representatives majority leader Dick Armey, R-Texas, 
said Homeland Security’s bid to integrate the offices is likely to run up against 
“parochialism” and tenacious “civic relationships.”45 
While there may be agreement that we need a different form of organization to 
make homeland security a success, it is also clear that no one has the answer. “We do 
know the question of collaborative enterprise pervades our society generally today. The 
issue arises in industry, government, defense and academe. We all face challenges of 
limited resources and large-scale initiatives.”46 
Regardless of who ultimately decides the definition of regionalization, however, 
the federal government is moving ahead with increased funding pressure for states to 
                                                 
44 The Century Foundation, Breathing Easier? Report of the Century Foundation Working Group on 
Bioterrorism Preparedness (New York, N.Y: Century Foundation Press, 2004), 2. 
45 Joe Fiorill, “Homeland Security bid to set up regional structure could hit roadblocks,” GovExec.com 
Daily Briefing (October 6, 2004). Accessed at 
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Information,” Inform South East Homeland Security Strategy  (Boston, MA.: www.region5mass.com, July 
26, 2004), 17. 
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regionalize. Either naturally or by force, the intent of the federal government is to have an 
intrastate system that works. The federal government position is that “Expanded Regional 
Collaboration” is an overarching priority that contributes to the development of all 36 
capabilities in the Target Capabilities List. It also supports the development of a 
seamless, national network of mutually-supporting capabilities to prevent, protect against, 
respond to, and recover from the full spectrum of threats and hazards. The federal 
government understands that each state has unique regional traditions, geographic 
features, and political realities that will influence how it organizes into regions at the sub-
state level.47 
Perhaps DHS realized the anxiety involved in setting up such a system. DHS 
officials have, for years, struggled to establish a network of regional offices for the 
department. Many openly question whether successful regional collaboration can be 
achieved without the development of a DHS regional system.48 Think tanks such as the 
Heritage Foundation have conducted in-depth research into the subject of regionalization 
as it pertains to multiple state activities and the value of adding a fourth tier to the three-
tier national emergency response system. In there report Empowering America: A 
Proposal for Enhancing Regional Preparedness (Special Report #06, April 7, 2006) the 
Heritage authors suggested that regional offices were needed and should not have 
policymaking or grant-making authority. Heritage sees the relationship under their 
proposal as one of partnership with state, local and private organizations in the region to 
identify critical gaps in preparedness.  
Further complicating the situation is the reality that “historically, the American 
governance system, divided into federal, state and local jurisdictions, does not provide a 
natural vehicle for discussing public policy issues from a regional, multi-jurisdictional 
perspective. The autonomy of local jurisdictions and competing priorities within and 
among them makes regional coordination difficult.”49 
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(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, January 19, 2006), 5. 
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B.  THIRD PARTY GOVERNMENT 
The National Capitol Area is a unique experiment in the concept of 
regionalization. The operational, administrative and governance issues are gigantic. The 
member organizations are the first to acknowledge that the regional makeup doesn’t lend 
itself to coordinated planning. Getting two states, the District of Columbia, a host of 
jurisdictions, nearly three dozen police departments, Capitol Hill, the executive branch 
and an independent judiciary to come together and produce a consensus plan is harder 
than herding cats.50 But, the driving force in the National Capitol Area is the 
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG). The special thing about 
MWCOG is that it involved first responders in its public safety initiatives from the very 
beginning. A collaborative atmosphere was a founding principle and especially after the 
Air Florida crash on January 13, 1982, which occurred at the same time a major snow 
storm and subway disaster were taking place. These events forced everyone to realize the 
value of inclusiveness for emergency responders and that a regional system was 
extremely helpful in major events. 
The problem with regionalization is more than one of power and control. “Third 
party government also raises fundamental problems of information asymmetry: the states, 
localities and private parties that must address issues such as homeland security may have 
much more sophisticated understanding of many of the critical facts that the federal 
government must know in order to do its job well.51 So, is it possible to have real success 
when you just leave it to those involved to work out all the details?  
The uncertainly of future terrorist attacks and the need for speed in providing for 
the defense of the nation are understandable in the macro sense. But, behind the concept 
of regionalization are the basic elements of involvement in the decision making process, 
developing relationships, and learning each other’s strengths and weaknesses. These 
elements are all benefits of regionalization if the concept is collaborative. The 
hierarchical model of federal administration involves the imposition of rules, often on the 
basis of limited consultation with the affected parties. This is unlikely to be effective in 
                                                 
50 “Our Unprotected Region,” Washington Post, Editorial Comment, April 3, 2006. 
51 National Academy of Public Administration, Improving Federal Relations with States, Localities, 
and Private Organizations on Matters of Homeland Security: The Stakeholder Council Model 
(Washington, D.C.: NAPA, March 2003), 2. 
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dealing with complex problems, such as many of the aspects of homeland security that 
call for management of organizational networks. However, several examples of workable 
solutions exist. For instance, the stakeholder council model provides a forum and a 
process for bringing many different stakeholders together jointly to develop solutions in 
defined areas of federal concern.52 
C.  REGIONAL NETWORKING PERSPECTIVE 
Based on the array of interpretations, neither the federal or state governments 
seem sure of the definition of regionalization. In reality however, the definition should 
focus on the collaboration of the various networks that interrelate on a daily basis. While 
different methods exist to help in collaborating, at least one method, the co-evolutionary 
approach does not require developing any new implementation strategy. Instead, it 
represents taking the blinders away to see what is actually happening – networks are 
organizing homeland security, not hierarchies – and then cooperating with the reality of 
how things happen, rather than remaining faithful to an ideal about controlling 
complexity.53 
Networks vary in nature and purpose, but many are held together by a 
nonhierarchical self-organizing process accompanied by an evolving mutual obligation 
among the players. Networks by nature can work horizontally among peers and vertically 
among the various layers of government. 
Never the less, “networks tend to involve large numbers of stakeholders, many of 
whom have quite opposite views, who come together to exchange information, examine 
the depths of a given problem, and explore “possible actions” that stakeholders might 
take. Some informational networks never make a decision, while others called “action” 
networks involve partners who formally adopt collaborative courses of action and/or 
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deliver services.”54 The action networks are in a real sense the type of networks that are 
making regionalization work in sporadic locations across the nation. Examples of this 
phenomenon are occurring in such places as the National Capitol Region, Dallas-Fort 
Worth, Texas, area and the Capitol Region of Hartford, Connecticut. These systems, 
made up of networks of public health, fire, police, emergency medical, emergency 
management and communication officials are succeeding because they use their strengths 
of organization, dedication, commitment and leadership. Weaknesses do exist in the form 
of funding shortages and liability concerns, however, these weaknesses are not slowing 
down the progress of the organizations. Are the action networks on the cutting edge of 
true regionalization? Are these subtle signs of the affect of globalization? 
Because the rapidly declining cost of communication is reducing the barriers to 
networks, other actors are becoming more involved in many governance arrangements 
that are not controlled by executives or legislatures of states. In other words, global 
governance involves private sector and “third sector” or non-governmental organizations, 
actors as well as governments. In the eyes of some analysts, the real losers in this power 
shift are less obviously governments that lack political leverage over policymakers and 
whose public image tends to be faceless and technocratic.55 
Regionalization by any definition should include the benefits of decentralization 
of power, placement of power in a definite area, and greater efficiency. Drawbacks as 
how to define the region, lack of guaranteed cooperation and potential power building 
must be considered. Still, these factors point to the potential value of regionalization 
within a state. Imagine a situation where a municipality is tapped out of resources and it 
simply requests assistance through an intrastate regionalized system. This layer of 
regionalization could provide access to resources owned by all the other local 
governments making up the region. This in effect becomes a second-tier of emergency 
management that suddenly makes any small police, fire, or public health agency 
comparable to the capabilities of a major metropolitan area. Next in line would be the 
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state, which in addition to its own resources, could easily access the resources of the 
other regions within the state. This system, as described, would have been invaluable 
during Hurricane Katrina. In that situation, resources in adjacent regions within the state 
were by-passed for state and federal resources, leaving many local response assets totally 
out of the picture. Their response could have occurred within hours.  
“We have expanded programs without expanding the federal workforce,” stated 
Paul Posner, managing director of federal budget analysis with the U.S. General 
Accounting Office, “and what that means is that state and local employees have become a 
shadow workforce for the federal government.”56 The same thing can be said of non-
governmental agencies such as those attempting to provide shelter support in the Gulf 
Coast Region.  
The short history of regional collaboration for homeland security is characterized 
by attempts of federal, state, and local governments to overcome a fragmented federal 
grant system and local jurisdictional barriers to assess needs, fill gaps, and plan for 
effective prevention and emergency response.57 
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IV. HOME RULE AND LOCAL AUTONOMY 
It is commonly believed that all politics and disasters are local. Conventional 
wisdom professed this idea prior to Hurricane Katrina. Then a dramatic significant 
emotional event took place. Suddenly in a matter of days, everyone in the world saw the 
complete collapse of an American support system that we all took for granted had 
existed. The politics in the Gulf Coast was anything but local. Katrina was not just a 
Hurricane; it was a vivid message about racial segregation, social class status in America, 
and the thousands of people with some type of disability who became the forgotten ones. 
Katrina, it could be argued, was a symbol of what we as a society try to forget.  
As a disaster, Katrina also proved anything but local. Mayor Ray Nagin could be 
seen on television pleading for any help he could get. Over 400 fire personnel from New 
York City alone would respond to New Orleans. Thousands of police, fire, public health 
and emergency medical personnel from across the nation would eventually be 
summoned. The feeling of independence that comes from autonomy would turn to a clear 
sense of dependence. The question of home rule for the affected parishes in Louisiana 
and counties in Mississippi seem like a mute point. This chapter will examine local 
control and why the forces of home rule, autonomy, and leadership are so strong? It also 
explores the impact these issues have on the regionalization of homeland security? 
A.  HOME RULE DEFINED 
The purpose of the Home Rule Amendments in any state is to grant the right of 
self-governance in local matters. Thirty-nine states employ Dillon’s Rule to define the 
power of local government.58 No state reserves all power to itself, and none devolves all 
of its authority to localities. Virtually every local government possesses some degree of 
local autonomy and every state legislature retains some degree of control over local 
governments.59 
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The federal position on regionalization tends to ignore the state and local 
government relationship. Local governments are creatures of the states and states exercise 
total hegemony over local governments. Under the concept of home rule (Dillon’s Rule) 
local governments are granted authority over matters of purely local concern. 
Home rule was created in 1875 and saw an initial wave of interest that lasted 
through the 1930’s. A second wave of state adoptions started after World War II. In 1953, 
for instance, the National League of Cities proposed a Model Constitutional Provisions 
for Municipal Home Rule.60 
Sometimes even though home rule is considered by some to be more myth than 
fact, it is still a factor to be reckoned with. New Jersey for example, has traditionally 
boasted its home rule orientation and citizens generally believe that forced 
regionalization can be construed as taking away local accountability.61 The New Jersey 
experience concerned school regionalization efforts and was a polarizing event in the 
sense that parents did not want their children going out of the neighborhood to attend 
school. Even the term “home rule” is somewhat confusing since the term has a dual role 
as both a political motto and a legal doctrine.62 
B.  REGIONALIZATION EFFORTS 
Most states are caught in cross-purposes. In order to receive federal homeland 
security funding (by any method of distribution), states are required to establish regions 
at their own discretion. But this mandate is an unnatural act for local government and 
raises the question will regionalization work? Just because we have the minds of state and 
local government, do we have their hearts? The standard answer to this question is “no.” 
The standard justification for this answer is that the attachment to local autonomy is too 
strong for central cities and suburbs to participate together in a regional approach to 
urban problems.63 
As discussed in Chapter II, there are generally three reasons to regionalize. First, 
some economic reason (such as joint purchasing); second, it helps allocate public 
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responsibilities to the different levels of government efficiently; and third, to bring the 
exercise of public responsibilities as close as possible to the citizen.64 
A significant number of states, including some without county government, rely 
on legislatively established regional planning offices or council of governments.65 “While 
seemingly a logical step towards establishing regional collaboration, a major blocking 
factor exists in the form of missing formal decision-making structures. The level of 
coordination between local government and first responder groups remains a barrier to 
regional planning efforts, according to a recent National Association of Development 
Organizations (NADO) survey.”66 However, seizing the opportunity, the National 
Association of Regional Councils (NARC) has declared to Congress that its 500 regional 
councils of government are fully prepared to provide the required structure and support to 
accomplish the goal of enhanced regionalization.67 The NARC offer could prove 
invaluable and will be further explained and explored in Chapter 8. 
Many times municipalities decline to cooperate in a regionalization effort because 
they think some other municipality will get more out of the deal than they do. For 
example, DHS grant funding practices in FY04 had the affect of discouraging regional 
participation because local governments could get approved equipment directly from the 
state. While the most successful and uncontroversial cooperative arrangements now used 
center around initiatives to save money, the DHS system was counter productive because 
it was not local money that was being spent or in affect being saved. Increasing local 
grant funds to municipalities that voluntarily participate in regionalization efforts would 
go a lot further in accomplishing the overall objective. 
States themselves become an obstacle because of conflicting positions on 
regionalization. It is the state that affirmatively creates home rule, places limits on a 
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localities ability to sign inter-local agreements and does little to create an atmosphere of 
collaboration. In fact, the home rule petition process and state supervision of municipal 
entities tend to encourage vertical interactions with the state at the expense of horizontal 
relationships among municipalities.68 
The question is how can the state help in the formation of regions? It has to be 
more than some oblique reference in several homeland security directives. Also, it has to 
be more than another state mandate. It is easy to be skeptical of regionalization when 
centralization in the form of state power is the true source of coexistence problems. 
Regionalism should become a byproduct of state efforts to enhance local power rather 
than limit it. Here again, states know the cultural differences that exist within there 
boundaries and how to include local leaders in a process that will enhance the goal of 
regionalization. For example, in states such as California and Missouri, state officials 
have easily achieved regionalization and been applauded for it. The key in the successful 
states has been active intergovernmental research and analysis on how to succeed and a 
commitment from the state’s Governor. Arizona conducted an in-depth strategic planning 
process on how to accomplish regionalization. On the other hand, other state experiences 
run the range from half-hearted effort and internal indifference to public power struggles 
and resistance to change. In Connecticut for example, it has been recommended that a 
state-wide committee be formed that would study regionalization and speed its 
acceptance within the state.  
Often, simple reality can be a powerful force. A declining urban core seeks to 
narrow city-suburban disparities through regional tax base sharing, school consolidation, 
metropolitan fair housing programs, revitalization of abandoned neighborhoods, 
economic development zones, and other policies with redistributive impact.69 The 
expectation is no different when it comes to homeland security. For example, under the 
FY06 risk-based funding policy, New York City objects to losing funds or being included 
in a larger region that results in the lost of funds to the city.  
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The profile of local development districts has been elevated through legislative 
mandates that clearly identify them as federal partners that help relieve not only 
conditions of economic distress in the nation’s regions, but that perform a 
“clearinghouse” or “one-stop shop” function for sub-state regional economic 
development.70 
The local development district concept is well established (as discussed in 
Chapter 2) even though the idea of regional government flies in the face of home rule and 
local control. Regardless of the problems generated by the parochialism and competitive 
nature of localities, the general belief seems to be that home rule and regional 
cooperation are at odds with one another.71 Challenges to regionalization will be most 
vocal at the local level, as “Americans like the idea of small, accessible, responsive local 
governments and have not been quick to embrace larger governing bodies.”72 
But the idea of small local governments can be a burden in carrying out the 
requirements of homeland security. For example, “in Missouri approximately 1,300 sub-
grantees successfully applied for grant funding across the state. This caused a tremendous 
workload and allowing each political subdivision to apply for grant funding individually 
led to the duplication of equipment and resources with close geographical proximity to 
each other.”73 This problem was common across the nation and many states chose 
different alternatives to solve the problem. But Missouri, in addition to establishing 11 
regions within the state, went a step further. The State of Missouri in partnership with the 
Missouri Association of Councils of Government (MACOG) forged an agreement 
whereby regional planning councils provide the operational structure to determine grant 
allocations and also handle the local administrative processing of the grant funds. 
Regionalization success is also occurring in states such as Kentucky and Texas.  
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Solutions such as the one in Missouri are generally in line with federal guidance. 
If one of the general reasons to regionalize is to save money, then Missouri’s answer 
meets the test. Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff has said many times 
that as a nation, “We are trying to buy all the homeland security we can afford.” 
Missouri’s solution also creates jurisdictional structures that help connect federal 
programs to local governments. 
Missouri’s response like the one in Kentucky shows that regionalization success 
can be accomplished. Conflicting pressures and evidence of resistance aside, home rule 
and local autonomy can be turned into positive forces if the effort is put into coming up 
with an inclusive consensus by all parties.  
C.  LABOR AND MANAGEMENT’S INFLUENCE 
Union resistance can be significant, especially in the Northeast, and leaders 
considering regionalization should analyze the impact of collective bargaining. The 
resistance is usually based on the impact of budget cuts over the past few years. For 
example, in places such as Pittsburg, PA., and Buffalo, N.Y., the idea that staff can be 
reduced and mutual aid resources from the region utilized, has been touted by consultants 
and endorsed by cash strapped politicians. In some states, unions are a powerful force and 
any action that may alter working conditions must be handled in a methodical manner. 
Public sector unionization is on the rise even though most states are right to work states.  
Organized labor believes they have been deceived by consolidation efforts in the 
past. Any discussion of regionalization, whether voluntary or mandated by the federal 
government, lives in the memory of past battles over job security. Participation in a joint 
task force (for example a regional law enforcement swat team) requires the agencies to 
realize a tangible gain for their communities or the effort will eventually dissolve. Other 
efforts, such as fire service strike teams, are generally temporary and incident specific, 
but are also based on perceived value to all parties. For example, fire service engine 
strike teams used on California wild fires.  
Management also has concerns about the impact of regionalization. Will the 
federal government cover the cost of the overtime required for incidents and training 
exercises required in the region? How many people will management allow to participate 
35 
in regional response teams, such as hazardous materials teams and bomb squads? How 
long does it take to get reimbursed, if there is any reimbursement? And the ever favorite, 
“since we don’t have terrorists in our town, why should we go to all this effort”?  
Additionally, management is not sure if there is any way to accurately calculate 
the value of all this effort. “Collaboration results need to be assessed because any loss in 
efficiency due to political, institutional and technical pressures diminishes public 
value.”74 
D.  A QUESTION OF EGO’S 
Can the human nature of the players interfere with the concept of regionalization? 
It certainly would seem so. There are a number of complex psychological reasons that 
may cause the parties required to regionalize not to agree. Not the least of these reasons is 
the lack of inclusion in the planning process. Many of the inclusive efforts so far have 
been symbolic at best and narrowly applied in reality as many state emergency 
management personnel see regionalization as an infringement on their position and 
authority. For example, in Connecticut, the planning process involved selected invitees 
from around the state with an even balance of state representatives. In Connecticut 
planning for homeland security is not based on regional input, but rather functional 
representation, such as police, public health and fire. The process is used to explain how 
the state investment justifications will fit into the overall expenditure of state homeland 
security funds. On the other hand, noted exceptions are in Arizona and North Carolina 
where collaborative inclusive efforts are well under way and championed by state 
employees.  
What happens when the grant money stops? Can the federal government continue 
to enforce a standard that is risk-based? Serious questions center on the motivation for a 
community to participate in the national agenda if they can not prove a danger of terrorist 
attack. Didn’t New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg exhibit big city egoism over a 
reduction in homeland security funding? 
Some sensitivity to the ego issue is being exhibited at DHS. In recent remarks, 
Michael Chertoff emphasized that the federal government would not supplant state and 
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local emergency responders on the front lines of a disaster. “The idea is to carefully 
understand your requirements, assess your capabilities, work with you to figure out what 
additional capabilities you need, and then draw upon the capabilities we have at the 
federal government to support you,” he said.75  
E.  FEAR OF EMERGENCE 
A recent analysis of the nation’s efforts revealed that the “fear of emergence” 
plays a role. “The phenomenon is what happens when you try to control everything. This 
concept applies at all levels of government. It is based on the proposition that control is 
not a property of complex human systems. The social, political, and economic world is 
not a product of control. It is the result of an emergent, self-organizing process.”76 This 
process is the emergence of the new science of networked social behavior. While one 
could argue that the Department of Homeland Security itself is an emerging activity out 
of the “self-organizing” principles of government, the real point here is that DHS does 
not indicate an appreciation for the various networks that actually make up the delivery of 
homeland security or how to effectively put them to use in the goal to enhance 
regionalization. 
F.  FINANCIAL INCENTIVES 
Some officials argue that with all the grant money flowing there should be some 
type of financial incentive to encourage intrastate regionalization. In Connecticut for 
example, each municipality that signed their FY06 homeland security funds over to a 
regional program earned an extra $2,000 of additional funds, up to a maximum of 
$75,000 for the region.  
The most pressing homeland security need in small metropolitan and rural areas, 
according to an overwhelming majority of National Association of Development 
Organizations survey respondents, is the need to provide incentives for regional 
cooperation among local jurisdictions.77 The survey reported an expected outcome, but it 
still offers a viewpoint that may have to be considered by DHS at some point in the 
future. 
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Many states such as New Jersey, have traditionally boasted its home rule 
orientation, and “forced regionalization” can be construed as taking away the local 
accountability of a particular constituent community which may regionalize. Providing 
financial and other incentives to reach the goal of regionalization only when it has been 
documented that benefits will accrue seems like the less controversial route.78 
Buying compliance for federal programs is the norm and the basis for numerous 
federal grants. But in this case, it somewhat undermines the concept of just doing the 
right thing for the common good of the community.  
G.  INPUT EXPECTATION 
The common theme among officials at the local and tribal level of government is 
that input into DHS programs has been non-inclusive or the review time is so short that it 
effectively prevents any real input. In short, the feeling is that the decisions are already 
made and that DHS just wants the other players to sign off on their decision.  
Even the states feel abused in this “input expectation.” Concern continues over 
the lack of state input into federal policy development. Homeland security directors are 
nearly unanimous in their recommendation that the federal government coordinate with 
states prior to adopting and implementing policies.79 
One would think based on their own experience with the federal government that 
states would be very sensitive and responsive to the input expectations of local 
government. One reason for this situation is that the states are the designated state 
administrative agent by DHS. If you control the money you have a power base and if you 
(the state) have to answer for the expenditure of funds in the audit process, the element of 
control is a natural reaction. However, this is still an uphill battle for many locals and one 
with very definable repercussions if not corrected soon. 
State and local officials often are suspicious of new federal initiatives. They feel 
threatened by possible erosion of their autonomy, leadership or authority; concerned 
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about new expenses being thrust upon them; annoyed at additional work responsibilities; 
afraid of being blamed for failure; and reluctant to expend time and resources.80 
A great deal of secrecy has cloaked the development of homeland security 
intergovernmental relations. According to the National Academy of Public 
Administration, “City and State officials who will work in regional networks apparently 
have had little input in the initial development phase. Approaching major changes from 
an intergovernmental management perspective has in the past been important in securing 
bipartisan support in Congress and in states and local governments.”81 This is a lesson 
that has been missed in the turmoil at DHS. 
Several states have eased legislative restrictions that interfere with 
regionalization. Indiana for example, has an intrastate mutual aid program that applies to 
every political subdivision of the state unless they have adopted an ordinance of 
resolution opting out of the program.82 Connecticut is proposing the same type legislation 
in the upcoming 2007 session. Other States have discovered that change to ease 
regionalization efforts is just not going to happen. “Governor Thomas Vilsack, of Iowa, 
came up with a plan to reduce government down to a reasonable number of sub-state 
entities, proposing fifteen (15) based on pre-established community college boundaries. 
The local governments didn’t buy the idea, opposition arose and the concept died a 
natural death. The idea missing even at the state level was that cooperative efforts seem 
to work best where there’s already a level of trust established on the ground.”83  
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V. RISK ACCEPTANCE ISSUES IN REGIONALIZATION 
What legal provisions common to state government for liability and risk purposes 
would prevent or impede regionalization? Might it simply be that anything that needs 
government approval chills the process, implies local government control and signals 
liability questions? Risk issues, especially items such as workers compensation concerns, 
would not have been on the radar screen for the Department of Homeland Security when 
making the regionalization decision. This concept itself would not create problems for the 
federal government because a subject such as liability would be covered under broad 
state legislation pertaining to civil preparedness forces. However, the unintended 
consequence is the liability gap created when regions are formed and respond to a 
regional incident that is not declared as a state or federal emergency. In short, coverage 
for risk related issues was apparent for federal emergencies or state declared emergencies 
within a given state. But, the newly designed intrastate regions are left in legal limbo 
until the state chooses to adopt an applicable state liability law that pertains to mutual aid 
and provide regulatory guidance on the proper activation of resources in the regions.  
It could be asked, if regionalization is so right, why do we need mutual aid 
agreements? Consider the impact of workers compensation issues, liability issues, the 
affect of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact Act and Robert T. Stafford 
Act on the establishment of regionalization. EMAC was designed specifically to address 
liability and risk issues before resources were dispatched to other states. EMAC in a 
sense acts as a contract between states that provides answers to questions on coverage for 
salary costs, lost equipment, and travel expenses in addition to liability protection. 
Certain portions of the Robert T. Stafford Act provide answers for federal government 
employees, but offer little in the way of state, regional or local liability protection. As of 
yet, neither of these two federal acts offers any real answers for intrastate liability and 
risk questions.  
In Chapter I, the question was posed whether we could rightly assume that all 
localities and states will accept the risks and liabilities associated with regionalization 
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without significant legal debate? As discussed below, this remains a tough issue and 
satisfactory answers still do not exist.  
A.  WORKERS COMPENSATION ISSUES 
While the model agreements cover issues such as who is responsible for injuries 
to members of the assisting unit, case law indicates that the requesting entities may be 
responsible for their worker’s compensation claims if they are injured during the 
response.84 Additionally, worker’s compensation issues change considerably when 
discussing volunteer organizations, such as fire departments and volunteer 
rescue/emergency medical units. With over 75% of the nation’s coverage provided by 
volunteer organizations, the worker’s compensation issue has a major impact on the 
willingness of the volunteers to participate in any activity outside their response district 
or for a host municipality to cover any response related injuries outside the legally 
recognized response district. This issue alone can be a major reason for a lack of 
willingness to participate in regionalization efforts. 
Some disaster response personnel, such as members of Citizen Corps Council 
Programs involving Citizen Emergency Response Teams (CERT), Medical Reserve 
Corps (MRC), hazardous materials response teams, urban search and rescue teams, law 
enforcement tactical teams, bomb squads and dive teams all commonly have some 
protection under certain federal and state activation procedures, but often have none on a 
regional response. 
B.  LIABILITY ISSUES 
Normally the attorney general of a given state handles all state claims arising out 
of the implementation of emergency plans, including claims for reimbursement of state 
funds or for compensation by the state for commandeering private property. It is a 
recognized legal concept that during a major disaster, officials may not always make the 
right decision or provide an effective response. For example, the controversy surrounding 
the actions of former FEMA Director Michael Brown and the collective reaction to his 
performance demonstrated the need for liability protection. Granted no law suits have 
been filed yet, but there are a number of areas that make it a possibility. As a general 
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concept of law, saying you have a plan and then not performing up the standards of the 
plan can create a general sense of liability. On the other hand, it is important to remember 
that federal and state law usually immunizes official responses to an emergency. Courts 
generally accord officials and first responder’s wide latitude to cope with extraordinary 
situations, concerned that inducing inaction could cost lives or property unnecessarily.85  
But with the advent of regionalization, there is a fundamental gap created in the 
legal rights and liability coverage of responders. If a first responder is working in his/her 
own jurisdiction they are protected for liability issues. If that same first responder is 
activated under a state declaration they are protected for liability issues by the state. If 
they are activated under a regional concept of response, without the permission of the 
state, they may not be covered at all. Regionalization as yet has no legal standing in 
reference to many serious liability issues. Local government response assets have legal 
standing under all state statutes when activated by local or state emergency management 
officials. However, a regional movement of assets and personnel leaves many questions 
unanswered. Who provides the liability and workers compensation coverage for CERT 
volunteers or Medical Reserve Corps members used on a regional basis where no state 
disaster has been declared? How will response costs be reimbursed? Who recognizes the 
credentials for professional medical personnel responding to an incident? Who provides 
command and control for the regional response forces? Taken as a whole, these issues all 
point to reasons for local government units not to embrace the concept of regionalization.   
C.  EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COMPACT 
Every governor is the state’s overall director of emergency management. 
Generally, governors command National Guard troops for their state, have the power to 
order evacuations and quarantines, can suspend purchasing requirements, commandeer or 
use private property, and can redirect all of the state’s personnel for emergency 
management purposes. Additionally, the Governor can authorize emergency funds and 
enter into mutual aid agreements with other states.86 The EMAC strategy is based on the 
simple premise that states ought to have the right to help one another during a period of 
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disaster. The EMAC legislation provides the mechanism for that assistance to be 
provided. Currently, only one state is not covered by an EMAC agreement.  
EMAC, while a very positive addition to response efforts, provides a perfect 
example of what’s wrong with the regionalization concept as proposed by the federal 
government. EMAC provides advance recognition and resolution of numerous legal and 
logistical issues. All efforts are designed to ease the utilization of the concept and speed 
up response. On the other hand, few if any states have developed clear legislation that 
covers an intrastate regional response to any type of incident. Many mutual aid 
agreements are nothing more than verbal arrangements that change when the 
organizational leadership changes. Initial efforts are just beginning to address this 
weakness. Indiana adopted legislation that allows for statewide mutual aid (automatically 
unless a municipality opts out of the system by resolution), where any county or 
municipality can help one another in the state. As a rule though, questions of coverage for 
liability and workers compensation costs are left to the local governments to decide. 
While EMAC provides an illustration of what can work, it is not mentioned in the 
National Response Plan and is not being used as a model to solve intrastate problems.  
D.  ROBERT T. STAFFORD ACT 
The Robert T. Stafford Act provides the basis for federal response to a state’s 
request for assistance during a major disaster. This act along with the Federal Tort Claims 
Act of 1946 serves as the guidance for claims against the United States Government. 
While the Stafford Act immunizes the United States against claims for an “act or 
omission of an employee of the government,” the Torts Claims Act waives the 
government’s sovereign immunity from tort liability for acts or omissions of its 
employees “under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be 
liable to the claimant.”87 
E.  CONCLUSION 
Risk acceptance issues commonly associated with the goal of enhanced 
regionalization are straight forward and permeate any policy discussions held by state 
homeland security councils or commissions. The first question asked by practically 
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everyone when requested for a disaster response is what level of liability protection do I 
have and what happens to me if I get hurt? These are simple questions with tough legal 
answers. Answers that as of yet have not been totally resolved and still stand in the way 
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VI. THE POWER OF MONEY — FUNDING DISTRIBUTION 
ISSUES 
There’s an old saying in the halls of power: “follow the money.” This statement 
applies whether you are in corporate America or any level of government. Money may 
not indicate any degree of leadership, but it will clearly indicate power and influence, 
especially inside the Washington beltway and when referencing federal grant funding 
processes. 
Money from the federal largesse has always been the source of struggle between 
political parties, federal agencies, state governments and local municipalities. Leadership 
in both the United States Senate and House of Representatives is for the most part based 
on what grant funds an elected official can push to his/her home district or state. 
But now we have a new game in town. Congress and the 9/11 Commission are 
insisting that homeland security funds be doled out by a risk-based formula. The 
Department of Homeland Security must develop a distribution formula different from any 
ever used by a federal agency for grant distribution. Never mind the fact that agreeing on 
a risk-based formula may be next to impossible. The Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) is a new robust agency and they can withstand the political beating that’s already 
begun. It’s the proverbial political dilemma - DHS may get it right and still be wrong. 
Everyone agrees that the risk-based process makes good sense as long as it does not 
adversely affect them. In the past, everyone got something, that’s what politics is all 
about. However, in the brave new world, we can only afford so much homeland security 
and everything can’t be critical. How can we be assured the new system will work? How 
will government agencies evaluate concepts like risk, threat and vulnerability? Just how 
much imagination and creativity can we stand in this journey to safety land? And, will the 
distribution of funds based on risk create a practical definition of regionalization?  
Chapter VI will explore the affect of grant funding, the emotional response it 
evokes from local governments, the funding process and the changing DHS role. The 
important point is to evaluate the impact of risk-based funding on the ultimate outcome of 
enhanced regionalization.   
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A.  NEW FEDERALISM 
Recent history of the federal grant wars is somewhat ironic and began 
approximately thirty-five years ago. President Richard M. Nixon intended to devolve a 
greater degree of decision-making to states and localities, but the changes that occurred 
during his administration ultimately expanded federal intervention into state and local 
governments. “New block grants and revenue sharing gave the federal government more 
influence over state and local policy-making because the federal government placed 
conditions on the use of the funds. Funds could be reduced or withheld if the recipient 
government failed to meet these conditions. Since block grants and general revenue 
sharing brought federal aid into many communities for the first time, “New Federalism” 
enabled the federal government to have more influence over American society than ever 
before.”88 
In accordance with the unwritten rules of any legitimate funding argument, we 
had to have at least one court case. Not just any case however, but a Supreme Court case 
involving then future Presidential candidate Robert Dole. The ruling was that “Congress 
may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds. However, exercise of the power is 
subject to certain restrictions, including that it must be in pursuit of “the general 
welfare.”89 
B.  A QUESTION OF POWER 
The quest for power and influence over the spending of the grant dollars goes 
deeper than restrictions at the federal level. In the case of homeland security, there is 
extreme emotion and billions of dollars at stake. Everyone wants their say in how this pot 
of gold will be spent. On top of this, the relationship among all levels of government is 
thought by some to be changing and becoming less certain. “At a high-level National 
League of Cities conference in 2003 the consensus of the participants in the roundtable 
discussion was that the federal-state-local partnership was in peril. In particular, panelists 
agreed that shifts in federal policy – including the current predilection toward block  
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grants, unfunded federal mandates, and tax-cuts – are weakening the federal role in the 
nation’s intergovernmental system and limiting the ability of state and local governments 
to solve urgent problems.”90 
 “The receipt of federal homeland security funding is contingent upon states 
completing, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) approving, statewide 
homeland security plans. Under federal guidelines, each state’s comprehensive plan 
should involve the active participation and input of local governments. However, in a 
recent analysis nearly 30% reported that their state’s process for involving local 
governments in statewide homeland security planning activities remained undefined and 
41% said it was only “somewhat” effective. When given the opportunity to provide 
general comments, a common observation among respondents to a National Association 
of Development Organizations survey was that states were often reluctant, or in some 
cases unwilling, to involve local government officials.”91 
Getting local government to be involved in the decision-making process is a 
major task since there are approximately 36,000 municipal governments, 3,000 counties, 
50 states and six territories. To further complicate the situation the federal government 
decided that they only wanted to deal with fifty state customers as administrative agents.   
The federal decision to only deal with state administrative agents may have been 
based on sound reasoning, federalism, or just the desire to limit political backlash. The 
decision however, did little to support the intended regionalization effort. Overlooked in 
the process was the fact that states have their own agenda, especially concerning 
homeland security. Many of the state homeland security funding policies reflect the 
conflict between the regionalization concept as dictated and the political power lost. For 
example, only a handful of states have committed to distributing grant funds through a 
system of regionalization. Also, in many states the grant requirement to distribute 80% of 
the funds to local governments changed the state’s code orange law enforcement 
reimbursement plans.  
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C.  THE FUNDING PROCESS 
The theme of the funding process that DHS set up undermines its own priority to 
foster regionalization. It does so in at least three ways. These are that DHS sent funding 
to the state administrative agents with direction to distribute 80% at the local level, but 
local involvement in the decision making was often nonexistent. DHS directed the state 
to decide the regional makeup of their state, but couldn’t resist determining the Urban 
Area Security Initiative (UASI) regions. And finally, DHS set up a competitive grant 
system that seems to undermine the overarching goal of regionalization and then they 
developed a complicated risk-based formula for distribution of the funds.  
The DHS funding program, while disjointed, began just like any other grant 
program. Multiple homeland security grant programs were consolidated for the ever 
present goal of efficiency. Funds were distributed based on the typical per capita formula 
that everyone recognized. It was obvious from the beginning that if danger lurked 
everywhere we could only afford a certain degree of security. Priorities had to be set and 
decisions made. It was assumed that cities like New York, Los Angeles, and Washington 
were on the top of any terrorist’s target list. The competition for funding became a 
competitive sport and most small municipalities sensed their security was not being 
considered. Distribution of funds based on anticipated risk was the battle cry at DHS, in 
Congress and in the big cities. 
“Proponents of a new funding approach hope to strengthen prevention, 
preparedness and response by providing more dollars to urban initiatives. This is a move 
opponents fear will leave America’s heartland vulnerable to terrorist attack and 
simultaneously provide terrorists easy access to urban populations by exploiting the 
weakest links in the nation’s security system.”92 Was the federal government telegraphing 
our pre-determined low priorities to terrorist world wide? Have we actually created a 
system of easy targets?  
Not surprisingly, political leaders pontificated about the righteousness of the risk-
based funding proposal and how it will support regionalization. “The idea of having some 
regional effort and dividing – defining regions in a meaningful way has moved us 
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towards making sure the money is being spent in those ways that really address the 
greatest risk and the greatest vulnerability” were the comments of presidential hopeful 
George Romney, a member of the Homeland Security Advisory Council.”93 But, you 
may ask “what terrorist is going to check the regionalization program before a target is 
selected?” New York City has perhaps the best response capabilities of any city in the 
United States and it was hit and still remains a major target based on the testimony of any 
number of terrorist experts. Part of the situation that exists is caused by the state 
administrative agency relationship in the states. While by law, there is an 80% local and 
20% state allocation, it does not mean that an easy cooperative relationship always exists 
or that money is flowing smoothly. One of the key discussion points in preparing the 
FY06 funding request dealt with the tools used to process the funding. “Regional 
collaboration and other such resources that are in place to support the grant allocation 
process” were to be discussed and outlined.”94 
The largest danger to continuity of funding is “supplantation,” the substitution by 
states of the large infusion of federal dollars for state spending. For instance, in 
Connecticut, the state proposed cutting $2.3 million in state funding for local public 
health departments – the same amount that was pledged to these departments under 
federal bioterrorism grants.”95 
“Funding has become a premium in most states and FY2006 saw significant 
decreases in basic funding for most states. The Justification and Investment process to be 
used with the FY06 funding and the regional approaches to manage federal homeland 
security dollars help to ensure that those funds are spent (in a manner) that is targeted at 
security gaps.”96 In Kansas “a significant portion of the 80% in funds required to pass 
through to local jurisdictions will be awarded with a requirement that they be used for the 
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purpose of regionalizing.”97 But even after the process is approved, it can still change. In 
Connecticut, one of the seven original justified projects was dropped (Investment #4 – 
Providing Secure Communications with requested funding of $7,521,128) and the other 
six projects were cut an average of 39% across the board. This was a politically expedient 
move that affectively limited in-depth questioning. Specifically, State Homeland Security 
Grant Program (SHSGP) funding for Investment #1- Expanded Regional Collaboration 
dropped from the justification and investment amount of $7,829,331 to the current 
proposal of $2,114,324 or approximately 27% of the original request. 
Part of the problem involves the inherent nature of the states dealing with pre-
existing grant systems and now having to deal with the new system absent any real 
definition of risk or how to evaluate risk. For example, states were asked to submit high 
risk sites under the Buffer Zone Protection Program, which they all did. In Connecticut 
hundreds of sites were evaluated as high-risk in 2003. The projects selected and funded 
seem to follow the “danger of the day” as determined by DHS and left some local 
officials surprised and baffled. 
D.  REALITY CHECK IN PROGRESS 
The whole concept of risk-based funding has been contentious. Many would 
argue that it only made sense to protect the highest risk-based priorities that exist in 
America. The concept seems innocent enough until the realities of politics and perception 
intersect on the definition of what a high risk target actually is. Even the large 
municipalities like New York and Washington were touting the virtue of the idea. That is 
until they saw the results of the funding scheme in May, 2006. Even with the system 
preview demonstrated by the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) regional selection 
and funding process, Congress and big city mayors were in for a shock. 
However, the shock had been anticipated by some experts. “When DHS compiled 
a list of critical assets supplied by the fifty states, it ran to several thousand facilities. But 
if everything is critical, nothing is. Widespread application of this term has made it 
impossible to focus on the private sector operations that are at greatest risk of being 
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attacked, either because they could generate large numbers of casualties, or because an 
attack would have a cascading effect on the rest of the economy.”98 
But is the funding policy put forth by DHS sending mixed signals? The UASI 
funding is targeted directly towards regionalization, while the rest of the nation’s 
communities are left to the defining policy of the various states. While regionalization is 
an overarching goal of DHS, not insisting on regional distribution of grant funding, 
weakens the intention. Nine states are choosing to use some form of regional funding 
during FY06, while most states will continue the population based per capita distribution 
of funds. This causes policy and funding priorities in forty one states to only vaguely 
reflect the professed strategy.  
Among the real obstacles to regionalization is the lack of funding in a true sense 
under the state guidelines. This means that many states have not yet (or have chosen not 
to) actually set up regional structures that would support reorganization into visible 
entities. A significant amount of regionalization funding remains diverted to broad 
programs that were already staffed. Some initiatives just changed the name of the 
program to comply with federal requirements. Secondly, by taking the war on terror 
overseas, we effectively are layering the defense of the nation and making it easier to 
assume no further attacks will ever occur in America. And third, the war in Iraq has 
monopolized the time of the President, allowing the dysfunctional operation at the 
Department of Homeland Security to surface. Congress is left to battle over billions of 
dollars, respond to complaints about risk-based funding and to decide the fate of the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 
As these realities began to play out, it became obvious to observers that risk-based 
funding was okay as long as perceptions matched political expectations. Suddenly, 
however, all across the nation that dream evaporated. The push for collaboration directly 
conflicted with parochial competitive attitudes. The fears of leaving America’s heartland 
vulnerable to terrorist attack before the announced funding distribution changed to open 
criticism of the risk-based funding process by the nation’s big cities.  
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In January 2006, media and editorial page comments such as “we think Chertoff’s 
plan will start to shape the kind of defense that should have already been in place” were 
common across the nation. For starters they continued, “Chertoff will make sure the 
funds go to cities and areas that actually have targets for terrorist attacks.”99 
Six months later, as disbelief set in, the attitude appears drastically changed. 
Coverage has now turned to such items as Representative Peter King’s (R-NY) blistering 
attack on DHS for taking money away from New York. “Homeland Security funding cut 
the city of New York by 40 percent. I have said then and I’ll say now: This was a stab in 
the back to the city of New York,” said King. It was indefensible, it was disgraceful, and 
it raises very real questions about the competency of this department.”100 
After months of pushing politically for the risk-based funding process, New York 
City was shocked when they loss approximately 40% of the previous year funding. In 
Mayor Bloomberg’s testimony to the House Committee on Homeland Security he 
presented a thought provoking question about the funding process. “I urge to ask if, by 
reviewing requests to protect more than a quarter-million critical infrastructure facilities 
across the nation, that DHS committed the classic error of losing sight of the forest for all 
those trees. Just because a facility is critical doesn’t make it a likely target and that’s the 
test that ought to be met in allocating high-risk funds. Re-defining of risk to include 
something for everyone leaves us right back where we started. Bloomberg called the 
whole process a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma,”101 
E.  HOMELAND SECURITY’S ROLE 
“But who should identify the risk factors that will determine funding is another 
fundamental policy question. House of Representatives Bill 1544 and H.R. Bill 2360 
propose risk factors that DHS is to consider, but both bills propose to give a large degree 
of discretion to DHS. Given the importance of data availability as a criterion, Congress 
may not be in a position to accurately determine risk factors, but because of its oversight 
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responsibilities, Congress might want to review DHS’ risk-based methodology and risk-
based distribution formula. On the other hand, by allowing a large degree of discretion to 
DHS in allotting federal homeland security assistance, Congress may not be able to 
determine in open hearings the reasoning behind the distribution of funding to states and 
localities.”102 
Michael Chertoff’s previous comments in March, 2006, seemed straight forward 
when he stated “As we get disciplined, as we focus on the reality of what we’re trying to 
protect – which are people, critical infrastructure, ports, things of that sort – we’re going 
to increasingly be looking to regional approaches, that put politics to one side and talk 
about real tangible things like risk – including consequence, vulnerability and threat.”103 
Chertoff seems to have significantly underestimated the putting the politics aside part. 
Few decisions have upset New York City as much as the current homeland 
security formula. In upstate New York the results were equally harsh and local media 
wrote, “This dramatic cutback translates into a loss to the Buffalo region of some $7 
million for 2006 and the outlook for the future is even worse. The region had expected 
$70 million in federal aid over the next five years and now, unless there is a decided 
change, any programs the region has been planning will have to be dropped, curtailed or 
funded from local taxes or state grants.”104 
The impact is not just on States and local governments. Funding to non-
government organizations also takes on new and often cruel appearances. “Another factor 
in the concern over whether the money continues to flow is perceived government bias 
against nonprofits. Homeland Security initially sought to protect private interests and 
government targets. Nonprofit officials say their crucial role in stemming the devastation 
of last year’s hurricane season, at times in place of a floundering government, has proved  
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the value of protecting nonprofits. Jewish officials cite Jewish hospitals and mental health 
clinics that deal with post-traumatic stress as examples of nonprofits deserving 
protection.”105 
F.  A COMPLICATED FORMULA 
Examples like those above are understandable reactions when you ask the basic 
question of “who cares.” When you consider the spending patterns that had developed 
under the per-capita system, local pressure to keep money flowing, and the 2006 House 
and Senate elections, the battle lines were drawn. The challenge to think new, be 
imaginative and stretch the boundaries suddenly sounded like a weak counter argument. 
The new system was an affront to the values of the stakeholders in this process. What 
was this secret formula? Who are they to determine the threat, vulnerability and 
consequence of a terrorist attack? In fact, 1/3 of the state’s score was based on effective 
response capability, while 2/3rds was based on likely terrorist targets in the state. While 
this information concerning response capability was ultimately revealed details of the 
evaluation of likely terrorist targets was withheld as sensitive data. 
New York City seemed to miss the impact of the overarching goal of 
regionalization. Look at Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay area and you see the 
realization that plans and programs have to increase in scope and cover the whole region. 
Also, look at what is happening in the National Capitol area and you begin to realize that 
Mayor Bloomberg’s riddle actually has a name. It is called regionalization. 
Is it just now becoming clear to state and local officials what regionalization 
really means? In the Nation’s Capitol it means multiple states having to think as one 
entity. In New York City it no longer means just the city by itself. The official 
notification was there if state and local governments were paying attention.  
The General Accountability Office (GAO) had already given notice. “Regional 
coordination can also help to overcome the fragmented nature of federal programs and 
grants available to state and local entities. Successful coordination occurs not only 
vertically among federal, state and local governments but also horizontally within 
regions. The effective alignment of resources for the security of communities would 
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require planning across jurisdictional boundaries; neighboring jurisdictions may be 
affected by an emergency situation in many potential ways, from implementation of 
mutual aid agreements, to accepting evacuated residents, to traffic disruptions.”106 
Will the argument extend to the hinterland? Some states have already begun to 
distribute the funding by regions. As a direct result of the decrease in federal funding all 
states are finding that regionalization (risk-based or not) will soon be a driving force in 
how funds are appropriated. For example, nine states have chartered a path like North 
Carolina. That state changed its formula for homeland security funding so money will no 
longer go automatically to local emergency management agencies.107 
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VII. REGIONAL LEADERSHIP 
Perhaps as important as money and commitment, the success of the Department 
of Homeland Security goal of enhanced regionalization depends on the ubiquitous 
requirement for leadership. Excellent plans, creative public safety announcements, and 
motivating speeches may be the norm, but they offer little measurable leadership impact 
at any level of government. At the proposed regional level, leadership evolves around any 
initiative based on proven need, clarity of vision and mission and a sense of community. 
Instinct drives us to protect and serve what we feel a part of. Reaching this basic instinct 
concerning homeland security should be natural and easy. But, the concept of enhanced 
regional collaboration has not flowed easily into the collective government mindset. 
Also, if the need for homeland security is obvious and the vision and mission understood, 
what secret will bind us to that sense of community? On 9/11 what phenomenon caused 
total strangers on Flight 93 to coalesce? As you surmise, the writer proposes that 
leadership or lack there of, is the critical ingredient. It will be the ultimate factor in the 
success of the enhanced regionalization goal.  
In this chapter, the subject of leadership as it pertains to the goal of enhanced 
regionalization will be explored. Stakeholder involvement, the impact of network 
interactions and shared decision-making will be introduced. Leadership weaknesses, 
politics and the mixed signals by DHS will also be analyzed. In the end, regions may be 
chasing the money, but without the leadership even the funds will not make an effective 
difference.  
A. OVERLOOKED NECESSITY 
Different authoritative sources rate the value of good leadership as 15–25% of any 
endeavor. Even the best plan may fail to move in a positive direction if there is no 
committed advocate or leader to push the initiative. Leadership, the subject of thousands 
of books, articles and essays, usually centers on definition, how it works and what it 
should be bringing to the effort in question. In reality leadership is sometimes easy to 
overlook, but almost always noticeable if it is absent. Leadership, even if hard to 
describe, is changing in our global environment like everything else in life. The new 
message moving across the horizon is collaborative leadership. “According to a report by 
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the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), leadership dedicated to 
stakeholder involvement is a critical characteristic of high-performing partnerships, 
second only to achieving results.”108  
Coupled with stakeholder involvement and critical to any leadership transaction is 
communication. As in any transaction, “it is a sound structural principle to have the 
fewest layers (or flatten out the organization) as possible because information theory tells 
us that every relay doubles the noise and cuts the message in half. Also, change 
leadership requires the willingness and ability to change what is already being done just 
as much as to do new and different things. It requires policies to make the present create 
the future.”109 And as Dr. Peter Drucker continues to point out, we must be able to 
separate confusing motion for action and understand there is a need for shared experience 
in the decisions. Otherwise, there is no common understanding or communications. The 
result of which is failure to accept the decisions or carry them out. There has to be an 
“us” for any communication or action to succeed, however, it’s the “us” part that’s not 
always present in homeland security efforts. 
“Key to the nature of leadership needed for regionalization is that the behavior of 
the system is determined by its agent’s interaction at the local level and this is the reason 
why the control of the crisis response system has to be distributed among its agents. All 
parts contribute evenly in a crisis situation, perhaps attempting diverse local interventions 
which will depend on four crisis response constraints: crisis characteristics, local 
conditions, available resources and prior crisis response experience.”110 
As demonstrated in the Hurricane Katrina response, “The homeland security 
system lacks a set of established institutional relationships and shared experiences that 
come from participants managing together across intergovernmental boundaries.”111 
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At the grassroots level, the biggest challenge will be maintaining the momentum 
needed to move forward with the action plan toward regional disaster resilience. Local 
governments and other organizations will need to take a leadership role in implementing 
the action plan activities and make a vigorous effort to retain and expand stakeholder 
interest and involvement.”112 This necessity may directly conflict with the DHS 
mentality as described below. 
B.  NATURE OF LEADERSHIP 
One of the obvious weaknesses in the Department of Homeland Security 
regionalization concept is the inability to guarantee that leaders will step forward for the 
task, or if they do, that they be competent or recognized as the leader by the other 
agencies. This is a vital necessity in any emergency because of the nexus between trust 
and reaction.  
Hurricane Katrina offered conclusive evidence that if leadership is missing it will 
be very obvious to everyone. During this major incident, DHS was inflexible, slow to 
change to the unfolding conditions on the ground and when the chain of command was 
interrupted, the Coast Guard was the only agency that was able to maintain a command 
presence in the area. “Federal authority – whether presidential, congressional, or 
departmental –to implement a top-down command and control system does not exist for 
homeland security because that system is intentionally fragmented and decentralized. 
Nonetheless, there continues to be tension between the necessity for command and 
control, and the goal of shared decision-making.”113 This reality became very obvious 
during Hurricane Katrina. Could it have been a clear sign of the influence of former 
Department of Defense personnel? DHS still does not understand, or seem to accept, the 
need to share decision-making with all elements of the homeland security network.  
To further complicate matters, the first responders of the world seldom use 
collaboration as the guiding value for operations. Emergency organizations are being 
asked to exit their silos, but it is a slow process and one based more on the needs of an 
emergency, rather than a natural state of affairs. Even in emergency operations 
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collaboration can run into egos. Research shows “three common problems occurring in 
the middle of disaster response include: a conflict over responsibility regarding new 
tasks; clashes over organizational domains between established and emergent groups; and 
the surfacing of organizational jurisdictional differences.”114 These three problems pretty 
much capture the basis for the resistance to regionalization and present a sound reason for 
the need for exceptional regional leadership to overcome these barriers. 
C.  HOW DOES LEADERSHIP WORK IN THE DHS MODEL 
Research on the subject of regional collaboration suggests that “when regional 
organizations are structured so that they include a wide range of stakeholders and 
promote collaborative decision making, they can advance regional coordination by 
creating a forum for those stakeholders to build rapport, solve problems regarding issues 
of mutual concern, and engage in information and resource sharing.”115 
An excellent example of this fact is the Capitol Region Council of Governments 
located in Hartford, Connecticut. The council established the Capitol Region Emergency 
Planning Committee (CREPC) in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, and 
had measurable success in forming a collaborative effort of over 125 agencies in a forty 
(40) municipality region of the state. CREPC worked for two years without any federal 
grant assistance forming the governance, policy options, operational capability and 
interagency collaboration needed to exemplify a true regional effort. This initial period of 
self awareness and dependence on regional neighbors provided a bonding experience for 
local leaders of all disciplines, showed the value of collaboration and sparked a “can do” 
atmosphere. 9/11 vividly brought home the fact that few metro areas have the ability to 
respond as New York City did and it was up to the region to create that type of response 
capability. The CREPC saw the need for regionalization a full two years before it became 
DHS policy because the 72 hour response gap of the federal government was a 
documented FEMA fact.  
Little noticed outside the State of Connecticut, the Capitol Region Council of 
Governments has evolved and matured to the point of managing and administering over 
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$11 million in homeland security funding in FY04 and FY05. This figure represents 
approximately 20% of all the homeland security funding received in Connecticut over 
that two-year period. 
The CREPC effectiveness is built on a set of values that include equality for all 
agencies, recognition of need, sharing a broader view of our world, a pledge to be 
prepared and a willingness to share resources for the common good of all citizens. 
Another illustration would be the Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Emergency 
Managers Group, which serves as the forum for that region’s emergency preparedness 
officials. 
D.  LEADERSHIP WEAKNESSES 
Regional leadership will not just suddenly appear. In many cases the legislative 
and cultural restrictions take a dramatic and emotional stand against accomplishing this 
objective. Certainly the promised grant funding will cause all the key players to listen and 
consider the regionalization effort. Unfortunately, some of the same key players will only 
pretend to endorse the intrastate concept of regionalization. However, absent the federal 
dollars, the real test will be whether the concept of regionalization survives. So the 
important question is what happens when the funding stream ends or requires a matching 
percentage from the local governments to receive federal funds? “Where regional 
collaboration is encouraged by the leadership and political traditions of state, regional, 
and local entities, flexibility for regional organizations to establish their membership 
requirements and collaborative processes is important.”116 In other words, if local 
political efforts are based on mutual understanding of the regional needs, it will build the 
commitment and value of regionalization. Mandating compliance as an operational 
method will not work to any high degree of success.  
 Regionalization on an intrastate basis, while not new, will require a change in 
organizational theory by local leaders. “In most cases, few mechanisms exist to 
encourage regional communication and cooperation among civic, government, and 
business leaders. Consequently, there is a lack of trust among local governments, 
between governments at the local and state level, and among the public sector, the private 
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sector, and citizens groups. Other sources of potential leadership are lost when business 
leaders are hesitant to lead large-scale regional initiatives, or if public officials are 
unwilling to support regional approaches.”117 Mechanisms and trust must be 
cooperatively developed to provide leaders the platform to act.  
Another change forced by homeland security efforts is that collaborative leaders 
will need to combine on how to make their agencies fold into a much larger response 
organization based on the concept of unified command. “Successful leadership will come 
from the strength of those individuals who seek a common goal. The challenges that face 
us will necessitate a pooling of resources, and it is unlikely that one individual will be 
able to produce all of the resources required for effective leadership of the whole. 
Although a central leader will still be present in many situations, ideas will be shared, 
power will be dispersed, and leadership will become more collective through networks 
and consensus.”118 
E.  MIXED SIGNALS 
Also complicating the quest for enhanced regionalization is the nature of the 
current governmental relationships. “Department of Homeland Security policy and the 
bureaucratic nature of state governments both add to the mixed signals involved in 
establishing regionalization across the country. Top-down planning processes must be 
redesigned to allow for more bottoms-up, locally based innovation and experimentation. 
In a diverse and rapidly changing state, a one-size- fits-all approach will not work.”119 
Fundamentally, homeland security is a shared responsibility at all levels of 
government. There must be a balanced, collaborative and inclusive approach to increase 
the value of the effort and for success. When compliance is perfunctory, there will be no 
real life in the effort and hence questionable results in a crisis. 
Understandably different approaches to effective regionalization will need to be 
pursued. Some models require immediate action, like New York City or the National 
Capitol Region, while others can proceed more deliberately. For example, “Arizona 
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conducted an efficiency organizational study to design and stand up regional 
organizations.”120 Other states simply let nature take its course, leading to a number of 
military and law enforcement dominated efforts across the nation.  
The diverse approaches while politically natural have an impact. 
“Intergovernmental relations structures seem to create inefficiencies and dysfunction, 
which now prove especially difficult for the Department of Homeland Security, because 
so many new and existing functions must be merged and managed. Some states have 
created homeland security “czars” who report directly to their governors, while others 
have placed this function under law enforcement or emergency management, some 
distance from the chief executive.”121 
Federal efforts to force regionalization through the Urban Area Security Initiative 
(UASI) program has produced documented success, but still it did not resolve the issue of 
progressive leadership where it did not already exist. Also, the shear amount of dollars 
devoted to the UASI program garnered leadership attention in the beginning. When the 
designated UASI areas begin to change, the result was an anger that drove leadership 
efforts to regain funding.  
But even in the UASI program, the General Accountability Office found that “in 
some locations, there were power imbalances, as well as political traditions and histories 
of competition that challenged regional coordination. Such challenges, for example, have 
been manifested by one or two jurisdictions making decisions about how federal dollars 
would be spent and how much funding other jurisdictions would receive.”122 These 
results tend to indicate the more common leadership with an agenda rather than 
leadership for the common goal of regionalization and efficiency. 
F.  THE POLITICS OF IT ALL 
Calling it local autonomy, parochialism or silo mentality only lends a description 
to historical context. In reality, local government values and culture resist being forced to 
do anything they didn’t really want to do. The federal viewpoint is that “in cases where 
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state and local traditions do not engender inter-jurisdictional collaboration, more 
prescriptive requirements regarding regional group members, decision-making processes, 
and planning can establish minimum thresholds for those activities and may provide an 
incentive for regional collaboration.”123 These thoughts contained in an official 
congressional report in September 2004 seem to lack a thoughtful insight into political 
relationships at the local level and hinges on wishful thanking at the federal level.  
 “Regions have hundreds of public, private, nonprofit, civic, educational, and 
other groups, all with interests in, bearing on, and potential for meaningfully participating 
in the tasks of governance.”124 All agencies must have collaborative participation and 
real involvement in the strategy and regulatory processes that exist for success to be 
achieved. Additionally, it certainly does not go unnoticed at the local level how 
dysfunctional DHS appears to be. Hurricane Katrina showed deep management and 
leadership problems within DHS and even with the reorganization continues to show 
large cracks in response and credibility. “The Department of Homeland Security wants 
state and local officials to partner, yet federal staff serving in the same states and cities 
often do not know one another or work well together.”125 The recent congressional 
restructuring of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) into a new look 
agency is another example of the federal turmoil. If DHS is supposed to lead by example, 
they may discover a shortage of followers at the state and local government level. 
Many regions have used different self-motivators to establish their brand of 
regionalization. Hampton Roads, Virginia municipalities were fostered by the efforts of 
the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) across city boundaries. In the 
Georgia coastal area leaders used the FEMA Project Impact Program as the driving force 
for regionalization.  
These are positive illustrations and point out that “a regional vision will not be 
implemented unless it taps into the political energy that originates in a strong sense of 
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shared values and priorities.”126 Consideration must be given to the political risk 
involved in regionalization efforts. From a personal standpoint many local officials have 
been burned and buried by consolidation. Regionalization by definition brings back many 
bad memories. Once again, voluntary or self-motivated regionalization initiatives have 
worked best because the commitment is there. In this case, “decision makers involved in 
the process have gained confidence and trust in the intentions and abilities of potential 
partners, based on past experience, so their individual political risk was reduced.”127 
Politics also allow consideration for the naysayers of the world. Regionalization 
just doesn’t set well with some first responders regardless of the intent. For example, one 
emergency management official wanted it made very clear to his constituents when he 
wrote in the organizational news letter that “To counter some rumors you may have 
heard, the Iowa Emergency Managers Association (IEMA), did not ask for 
regionalization of Homeland Security, and is not driving it. The majority of IEMA 
members were not in favor of creating six such large regions in the state.”128 
Conversely, there is hope for a few converts. Another law enforcement official 
writes that “shortly after being inducted as your President, on behalf of the Association, I 
got directly involved in the lengthy and sometimes difficult discussions on 
regionalization of homeland security funding. While I still have some concerns about 
implementation of the plan, Michigan appears to be on a good path of regional planning 
for critical incidents of major proportion.”129 
Comments like these and many others are repeated daily across the nation as 
officials sort through the repercussions of regionalization and determine the degree of 
acceptance it will get. One can only surmise what might have been the outcome of  
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Hurricane Katrina had a true intrastate regionalization process been in place. Gulf Coast 
leaders may say otherwise, but intrastate regional support was not evident during the 
disaster and was officially noted. 
G.  CONCLUSION 
In summary, regional intrastate leadership might have been expected by DHS and 
even anticipated. But for the most part, the planned leadership has not been uniformly 
established across the country. Money, politics and government bureaucracy have 
provided the real drive for the national status in homeland security. Understanding 
stakeholder involvement, network theory for organizations, and shared decision-making 
have not been as abundant. In the introduction, the questions were asked about what 
secret binds us to a sense of community, and what phenomenon caused total strangers on 
Flight 93 to coalesce? The answer is it’s something that always needed for action to occur 
and when missing it demands our immediate attention. That secret is leadership – the 




The primary hypothesis as stated in Chapter I was that there is a mismatch 
between the federal government’s expectations of regionalization and the understanding 
of it by state and local governments. It is further anticipated that this lack of 
understanding will negatively impact the expenditure of federal funds in the future. The 
writer contends that there are six major reasons the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) initiative may fail. Those reasons include a lack of definition for regionalization; 
the impact of federalism; the influence of risk-based funding on local interest in 
regionalization; the impact of home rule and local autonomy; risk and liability questions; 
and the lack of leadership.  
With high priority issues such as risk-based funding, recovery from Hurricane 
Katrina and congressional activity to resolve the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) question, it is highly unlikely that any DHS attention is being given to 
this potential failure or that it is even remotely considered as a problem. With the 
exception of the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) program, which provides some 
insight into the dangers associated with regionalization, there may be no reason to suspect 
there is a problem brewing. The potential failure of regionalization is a different type of 
problem because there will not be a battle over policy or funds. There probably will not 
be any colossal firing of DHS officials or media feeding frenzy. Just the sober realization 
that after spending billions in tax dollars, a key tenet of the homeland security overall 
goals is dysfunctional. This type of problem is usually replaced with a new initiative 
cleverly designed to cover the failed policy.  
Will regionalization be the subject of a future congressional Research Study or 
think tank analysis telling us that Congress should either kill the program or correct the 
problem? The federal government has already documented in the House Committee on 
Government Reform Report (2004) titled Homeland Security: Effective Regional 
Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness that the American governance 
system, divided into federal, state and local jurisdictions, does not provide a natural 
vehicle for discussing public issues from a regional perspective. Other factors such as a 
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top-down command mentality by the federal and state governments, waning interest by 
local governments and a lack of guaranteed leadership will further complicate the 
regionalization initiative. 
Are there any flexible robust alternatives to enhance regional collaboration? 
Based on the research, the author suggests three options for consideration. Option one 
maintains the status quo. Option two offers the idea of federal guidance and control 
through the form of a “Regional Homeland Security Service Agency” that would increase 
the probability of successful regionalization. Option three offers the idea that guidance 
and control should come from the bottom up, through a Regional Council of 
Government, or “RCG approach.” This option significantly enhances the probability of 
success, because it utilizes municipal relationships and leadership that is already tested 
and proven.  
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to explaining the options. The 
options will be evaluated based on command and control methods, degree of 
inclusiveness, definition and structure, conflict with home rule and local autonomy, 
participant resistance to the program and degree of collaborative leadership involved. 
Some evaluation factors, such as impact on risk and liability and financial controls/audit 
procedures, present the same result regardless of the option selected and therefore will 
not be used in the analysis. 
Finally the writer will make a recommendation as to which option appears to offer 
the most promise of regional success.  
A.  OPTION ONE — MAINTAIN THE SAME PROGRAM (TAKE NO 
ACTION) 
This is the easiest option to choose, but it fails to answer the many questions 
described in this thesis. 
An analysis of the evaluation factors for option one is described below:  
• Command and control – Top down federal application 
• Degree of inclusiveness – Mostly non-inclusive relying on state review of 
policy 
• Definition and structure – Both factors left to the discretion of the state  
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• Conflict with home rule and local autonomy – Ignores the home rule 
concept and offers some recognition of local autonomy 
• Perceived participant resistance – High based on risk-based funding, 
lack of inclusive input and the top-down federal command and control 
• Leadership effectiveness – Ignores this factor and plays no role in 
guaranteeing leader competence or support 
Maintaining this option would continue the somewhat ambiguous direction 
already established by DHS. The highlights of this option are the continuing lack of a 
clear definition of regionalization and a lack of guidance except for funding and 
expenditure procedures. 
As predicted by this thesis, the most likely outcome will be a continuous 
shrinking of the funds in future years and a corresponding decrease in interest from local 
governments. Basically homeland security funding has not been flowing long enough to 
build any institutional loyalty at the state or local government level. 
In addition, there will be a continued lack of political awareness that a problem 
may exist. The overarching goal of enhanced regionalization will not gain any real 
traction because Congress is sidetracked by the question of FEMA like regions for DHS 
on the federal level. The current system of dealing with 50 state administrative agents and 
35 UASI regions supports the cover story for regionalization and maintains control at the 
federal and state levels, but conversely offers spotty evidence of local government buy-in. 
While the current system builds on the state’s power, there is no evidence if 
federal funding stops the states would pick up the costs of homeland security within their 
respective state. This predicament is further compounded by command questions, state 
laws that block definitive regionalization efforts and the potentially explosive belief that 
local governments are willing to relinquish control.  
B.   OPTION TWO — AN INTRASTATE REGIONAL PROGRAM BASED ON 
FEDERAL GUIDANCE — THE REGIONAL HOMELAND SECURITY 
SERVICE AGENCY 
In option two, the writer recommends the establishment of the Department of 
Homeland Security Regional Service Agency. This option proposes that the federal 
government set up intrastate regional offices in the 35 UASI regions as well as the other 
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approximately 370 state designated regions in the nation. Under this option each of the 
approximately 400 regions would receive direct guidance and control from the DHS.  
This option very loosely resembles the current system used for the 35 (actually 46 
counting transition locations) Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) sites. The federal 
government considers the UASI regions as direct customers for operational purposes. 
Administrative grant requirements would be still handled by the State Administrative 
Agent. This option is fashioned after the Department of Agriculture Farm Service 
Agency, which has multiple office locations in every state generally based on county 
level operations. 
The Farm Service Agency handles five major programs at the local level. Those 
programs involve farm loans, price support, commodities, conservation and disaster 
assistance. In a similar fashion the proposed Regional Homeland Security Service Agency 
would handle programs such as prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, training 
and exercises, and grants administration. Under this option, the federal representative 
becomes an integral part of the region, is known to all local agencies and provides a 
mechanism for collaborative inclusive interaction by all players at all levels. The state 
becomes a customer in the system just like regions. The power relationship changes to 
one of partnership instead of vertical command and control. 
An analysis of the evaluation factors for option two is described below: 
• Command and control – Changes to direct federal participation with 
state and local involvement  
• Degree of inclusiveness – Offers high degree of direct input into policy 
• Definition and structure – Clearly defines the region and the service 
agency structure provides evidence of the federal commitment to 
enhanced regionalization. 
• Conflict with home rule and local autonomy – Potential to increase 
conflict over home rule due to state’s reduced influence and at the same 
time increase local autonomy due to less state influence in grant 
application  
• Perceived participant resistance – Lessened due to direct access to 
federal representative and increased information sharing 
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• Degree of collaborative leadership – Offers a higher degree of 
collaborative federal involvement and identification of individual regional 
leaders  
Option two, the Regional Homeland Security Service Agency increases clarity and 
further defines regionalization. It offers a positive affect on the level of interest by all 
governmental players. It also offers direct and inclusive opportunities for grant funding 
decisions and puts a face on the federal government at the regional and local level. This 
system offers a high degree of service delivery and increases political awareness of the 
regionalization issues. 
Conversely, this option would be subject to attack from state’s rights advocates 
and fiscally conservative parties. As with option one, federal funding continues to 
decrease, however the most likely future outcome is a continuing degree of success. This 
would be primarily due to the commitment at the regional and local level, the federal 
presence, and sense of collaboration. 
C.  OPTION THREE — AN INTRASTATE REGIONAL PROGRAM BASED 
ON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS FACILITATION — THE REGIONAL 
COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS (RCG) APPROACH 
In option three, the writer recommends the utilization of the national system of 
regional council of governments that already exists. “The nation’s network of 520 
regional development organizations and regional councils of government provide forums 
for local elected officials and other key community stakeholders to explore and address 
issues of regional significance. As organizations formed and governed primarily by local 
officials, these regional organizations have credibility with local governments, years of 
experience in coordinating local efforts across political boundaries and the capacity to 
provide regional forums for dialogue, coordination and strategic planning.”130 
Regional development organizations are uniquely positioned and qualified to 
coordinate, plan and implement essential homeland security efforts. These activities 
range from coordinating the integration of first responder communication systems, to 
managing the GIS data and tools necessary to enhance local decision making, to 
developing comprehensive response plans, to conducting regional forums.131 
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An analysis of the evaluation factors for option three is described below: 
• Command and control – Bottoms up originating at the regional level and 
operating both vertically and horizontally 
• Degree of inclusiveness – Offers highest degree of inclusiveness 
• Definition and structure – Region is defined by natural community of 
interest and the structure is clearly defined by state statutes 
• Conflict with home rule and local autonomy – The RCG approach 
offers no conflict with home rule and since the Council of Governments 
are controlled by local governments, there would be little threat to local 
autonomy 
• Perceived participant resistance – The option offers the least chance of 
participant resistance because it is controlled by the local governments 
• Degree of collaborative leadership – The RCG approach offers the 
highest degree of collaborative leadership because regional leaderships are 
a major function of a Council of Governments and the collaborative 
inclusive atmosphere required for success already exists. 
Option three, The RCG Approach, provides a high degree of clarity and comes 
with a built in definition of regionalization based on political buy-in by the participants. It 
offers an efficient and cost effective method of building off the strengths of existing 
relationships. The motivation for collaboration and quality service delivery are inherit in 
the regional council of governments system. This option offers the highest degree of 
political awareness plus allowing Congress to have a buffer against the certain political 
complaints to follow. 
The most likely outcome from establishing option three would be success based 
on strong relationships forged through experience and knowledge of strengths and 
weaknesses in the system. Also, the state would be more inclined to support option three 
as it does little to undermine their authority to act. Additionally, it preserves the 
traditional power of the state and their ability to lead through the state statutes. 
The federal government can provide support for regional coordination. In 
particular, through its grant design and requirements, the government encourages 
structures and practices associated with effective regional efforts. Requiring a grantee to 




establish themselves based on their regional environment, requiring a strategic plan and 
targeting funding for collaborative regional groups are ways to enhance the 
regionalization goal.132 
Option three offers some other advantages. The change to risk-based funding is 
not likely to severely impact on option three because the regions already exist and will 
continue to function even if the grant funding is reduced.  
D.  CONCLUSIONS 
As stated in Chapter I, a policy adjustment by the federal government is necessary 
to increase the chances of success for regionalization. Without it, regionalization as a 
workable concept faces a vague shallow outcome, referenced only by state administrative 
agents to keep the funds flowing. While cited on paper and described in plans, 
regionalization will not exist operationally or in the minds of local government officials. 
Networks play a significant role in solving the mystery of how to create a 
workable intrastate regionalization system. While networks per se were not the center of 
the research, they obviously are critical to understanding how to solve the problem. 
Everything we do in life connects through some type of network. Under the current 
ambiguous situation, networks are talked about, but undermined through federal policy 
that forces relationships based on functional responsibility instead of a natural 
community of interest.  
Clarke and Beers research indicates that “since the initiation of programs to 
respond to terrorism in the homeland beginning in the mid-1990s, the federal government 
has failed to be specific about the priorities for creating new capabilities at the state and 
local level. There has also been a tension between state governments and their 
subordinate jurisdictions, cities, and counties. Both levels of local government have 
sought to create and manage new programs and to control the use of new federal 
assistance funds. Every city and town has wanted to have its own new homeland security 
assets and to decide what they should be. Every state has also sought to centralize 
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homeland security control in the state capitol. In most states, neither of those two 
approaches (city-centric or state-centric) is ideal.”133 
Option one, maintaining the status quo, is a viable option in the sense that it’s 
what we have done so far and who knows what the definition of success is going to 
ultimately be. If the situation eventually evolves into one of the 35 major population 
areas (UASI) being the only real regions that DHS is concerned about, then what happens 
to states that don’t have UASI regions? Are they the new collateral damage areas? 
Marked off as the necessary loss in a much larger priority of common good for the 
nation? 
The second option, a Regional Homeland Security Service Agency, creates a 
micromanaging perspective. While creating jobs and flying the colors, it also creates 
more bureaucracy. This option would appear like a drastic reaction in a conservative 
administration and definitely be opposed by states perceiving it as a lost of their power. 
The third option, the Regional Council of Governments (RCG) approach, is the 
recommended option by the writer. It keeps the federal government out of the state’s 
business. It uses contractors, which appeal to the conservative base. It keeps the states 
happy because they control the grant funding, keeps the ultimate power at the state level 
and they don’t have to do the work.  
Option three makes the local government happy because it’s inclusive, uses an 
existing power structure and is self-directed. The leadership question is answered in most 
cases, provides a bottom-up approach to command and control and does not base 
continued existence on the continuation of federal grants.  
If the overarching goal really is to enhance regional collaboration, protect the 
entire nation, and maintain a sustainable effort, then the author would recommend option 
three, the “Regional Council of Government Approach.” 
Regionalization of homeland security efforts in the United States can succeed if 
based on clear definitions, solid leadership and a system that allows input into the 
decision making process from the regional level.  
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